Gideon, Miranda, and the Downside of Incorporation by Mannheimer, Michael J. Zydney
 
 
401 
 
Gideon, Miranda, and the  
Downside of Incorporation* 
 
 
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer** 
 
Abstract 
 
The United States Supreme Court decisions in Gideon v. 
Wainwright and Miranda v. Arizona are cut from the same cloth.  Each 
was the result of the Court’s frustration with the tedium of case-by-case 
analysis, and so each represents a broad, bright-line rule.  Gideon 
dictated that in all serious criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to 
counsel, ending the muddled, multi-factor analysis of Betts v. Brady.  
Miranda dictated that in all custodial interrogations, the suspect is 
entitled to counsel and to be informed of that right and his right to 
remain silent, purporting to settle three decades of lack of clarity in the 
jurisprudence of coercive interrogations. 
And both Gideon and Miranda are widely perceived as failures.  
Miranda, a contentious 5-4 decision once decried by conservatives as 
having gone too far, has spawned a jurisprudence widely recognized by 
liberals as anemic.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, warnings are 
given and a waiver obtained, and courts in such cases are highly unlikely 
to rule that a confession was coerced irrespective of what occurred 
following warnings and waiver.  Gideon, once a warmly greeted 
unanimous decision, is now almost uniformly looked upon as 
representing a promise unfulfilled.  In large part, this is a result of 
Strickland v. Washington, whose test to determine whether counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective prevents courts from disturbing convictions 
except in the most extreme cases, where counsel’s actions can have no 
conceivable strategic justification. 
This Article argues that the perceived failings of these two doctrinal 
lines spring from the same source: the use of very strong presumptions 
that sharply constrain judicial discretion.  Miranda evolved into a rule 
establishing a virtually irrebuttable presumption that statements 
resulting from a custodial interrogation are uncoerced if they are 
preceded by warnings and waiver.  Gideon evolved into a rule 
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establishing a virtually irrebuttable presumption that if the defendant 
had an attorney, that attorney performed adequately to protect the 
defendant’s rights.  As a result of each rule, judges are largely prevented 
from sifting through the messy facts of individual cases. 
This Article further argues that these later developments cannot be 
explained exclusively in crass political terms, as the result of more 
conservative Courts cutting back on rights granted by the liberal Warren 
Court.  Rather, they were largely the result of the incorporation agenda 
of the Warren Court itself.  By its nature, incorporation favors bright-
line rules, as contrasted with the nebulous standards of fundamental 
fairness analysis.  Gideon and Miranda represent two such rules.  But 
bright-line rules typically do not entirely replace nebulous, multi-
factored standards.  Rather, rules often either move standards to other 
places in the analysis or generate the need for entirely new standards.  
Thus, multi-factored standards persisted after Gideon and Miranda, in 
the form of the tests used to determine whether counsel was reasonably 
effective and whether an interrogation was coercive despite the provision 
of Miranda warnings.  But because the Court had fully bought into 
incorporation by the end of the Warren Court era, and because 
incorporation exerts a strong preference for rules over standards, the 
Court was required to erect further rules to support the structure it had 
begun to build in the 1960s.  These “scaffolding” rules, in the form of the 
heavy presumptions mentioned above, were advanced by liberal and 
conservative members of the Court alike. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
We recently celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.
1
  Before we know it, we will be observing 
the golden anniversary of the decision in Miranda v. Arizona.
2
  These two 
landmarks of the Warren Court
3
 are rarely discussed together.  This is surprising, 
as they are cut from the same cloth.  Each was the result of the Court’s frustration 
with the tedium of case-by-case analysis, and so each represents a bright-line rule.  
Gideon dictated that in all serious criminal cases, the defendant is entitled to 
counsel, ending the confusing and unpredictable analysis required by Betts v. 
Brady.
4
  Miranda dictated that the products of custodial interrogations will be 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1   372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
2   384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3   Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 884 n.1 (2013) (characterizing Gideon and Miranda 
as “landmarks in criminal law”). 
4   316 U.S. 455, 456–57 (1942). 
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admissible only if the suspect is first informed of his rights to silence and counsel, 
and if he waives those rights, purporting to settle three decades of muddled 
jurisprudence in the law of coercive interrogations. 
And both Gideon and Miranda are widely perceived as failures.  Miranda, a 
contentious 5-4 decision once bemoaned by conservatives as having gone too far, 
has evolved into a jurisprudence widely recognized by liberals as not having gone 
far enough.  In particular, because the overwhelming majority of criminal 
defendants waive their Miranda rights, and because the provision of these 
warnings is regarded as “a virtual ticket of admissibility,”5 what was initially 
conceived of as a roadblock to coercive police tactics has been transformed into 
little more than a speed bump.  Gideon, once a warmly greeted unanimous 
decision, is now almost uniformly looked upon as having been severely undercut 
by later developments.  Though several culprits can be blamed for Gideon’s 
perceived demise, a prime suspect is the Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington,
6
 which erects a virtually irrebuttable presumption that any warm body 
with a law degree sitting next to the defendant during trial has provided effective 
assistance of counsel. 
This Article makes two arguments.  First, it claims that the perceived failings 
of Gideon and Miranda spring from the same source: a heavy presumption that 
constrains judicial discretion by preventing judges from looking too closely at the 
facts of individual cases.  Gideon evolved into a rule establishing the presumption 
of attorney competence, a virtually irrebuttable presumption that if the defendant 
had an attorney, that attorney performed adequately to protect the defendant’s 
rights.  Miranda evolved into a rule establishing the presumption of non-coercion, 
a virtually irrebuttable presumption that statements resulting from a custodial 
interrogation are uncoerced if they are preceded by Miranda warnings and waiver. 
Second, this Article argues that the conventional account of the evolution of 
Gideon and Miranda in crass political terms—as the results of the conservative 
backlash of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts against the progressivism of the 
Warren Court—is incomplete.  The trajectory of both Gideon and Miranda, both 
upward and downward, cannot be understood divorced from the push toward 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.  It was this push that led the Court to generally 
eschew nebulous, multi-factored standards in favor of bright-line rules.  And it was 
this push that ultimately led the Court to employ the prosecution-friendly 
presumptions discussed above.  For once the Court created the bright-line Gideon 
and Miranda rules, the indeterminate standards those rules supposedly displaced 
did not disappear.  Rather, they simply moved from one part of the analysis to 
another (in the case of Miranda) or changed in form (in the case of Gideon).  
Provision of counsel through Gideon’s bright-line rule simply triggered a multi-
factored standard as to whether counsel was effective.  And compliance with the 
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6   466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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warnings-and-waiver protocol of Miranda’s bright-line rule simply returned 
custodial interrogation to the status quo ante, with courts determining the question 
of coercion using the same old due process voluntariness test the Court thought it 
was replacing in Miranda.  But because the Court had already rejected the 
nebulous, standard-like fundamental fairness approach in favor of the more 
determinate, rule-like incorporation approach, further refinement had to take the 
form of additional rules, not standards.  Once standards were replaced by rules, the 
Supreme Court needed to provide lower courts with guidance, in the form of these 
discretion-minimizing presumptions, lest they fall back into the morass of the case-
by-case adjudication that was the hallmark of due process methodology prior to the 
incorporation revolution.  Seen in this way, the presumptions of competence and of 
non-coercion were as much the result of the Warren Court’s incorporation project 
itself as they were the product of conservative backlash. 
Part II of this Article describes the groundbreaking decisions in Gideon and 
Miranda and the messy jurisprudence each decision displaced.  Part III sketches 
the path of each jurisdictional line as it evolved into what many regard as an 
anemic rule that has failed to live up to its promise.  This Part looks at the 
presumptions established by each doctrinal line which largely constrain judges 
from honestly confronting arguably coercive police tactics and incompetent 
lawyering.  Part IV explains this shared aspect of the Gideon and Miranda lines as 
the result of the Warren Court’s project to incorporate the Bill of Rights through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Once the incorporationist Court had conclusively 
replaced nebulous standards with bright-line rules, there was little room for case- 
and fact-specific determinations whether due process had been afforded in 
individual cases.  Instead, the Gideon and Miranda rules had to be “scaffolded” by 
additional rules that were largely insensitive to case-specific facts. 
 
II. GIDEON, MIRANDA, AND THE ROAD TO INCORPORATION 
 
The tale is a familiar one.  Out of a deep respect for the values of federalism 
undergirding our constitutional system, the Supreme Court for most of its history 
was reluctant to impose hard-and-fast rules on the States to implement the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s command that the States not deprive persons of “life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.”7  On the other hand, to ignore the 
paltry nature of what was sometimes deemed by the States to be “due process” 
would have amounted to abandonment of the judicial role.  Instead, the Court took 
a middle approach, holding the States to a nebulous “fundamental fairness” 
standard that looked to multiple factors, all relevant but none dispositive, to 
determine whether due process had been afforded. 
That project, most would agree, was a failure.  The lack of hard rules wrought 
a lack of consistency among lower courts.  Worse, the standards were so malleable 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2015] THE DOWNSIDE OF INCORPORATION 405 
 
 
as to be easily manipulated to get to the desired outcome.  And in a legal system 
that relies upon predictability of outcomes to guide behavior, the fuzzy standards 
of “fundamental fairness” resulted only in uncertainty.  So the nebulous standards 
were replaced by bright-line rules.  Thus did the Court take the long road from the 
“fundamental fairness” approach to the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
“incorporation” approach. 
 
A.  From Fundamental Fairness to Incorporation 
 
The Supreme Court held long ago that the Bill of Rights applies only to the 
federal government.
8
  Yet after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, 
the States were forbidden from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.”9  Thus, the questions for state criminal procedure 
became what “due process of law” required and, more specifically, whether and to 
what extent it applied the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the States.  The Court 
began the twentieth century by requiring that States obey an amorphous 
“fundamental fairness” standard that encompassed some, but not all, of the same 
principles embodied in the Bill.  By the end of the Warren Court era in 1969, the 
Court had reversed course and embraced the incorporation of virtually all of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause, thus making them 
applicable against the States. 
The paradigmatic description of the Court’s practice of imputing to the Due 
Process Clause only those protections associated with “fundamental fairness” can 
be found in the Court’s decision in Palko v. Connecticut.10  The specific question 
presented there was whether the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause11 
applied to the States via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In 
rejecting the petitioner’s claim that it did, the Court described the restrictions 
imposed by the Due Process Clause in these narrow terms: it encompassed only 
“the specific pledges of particular amendments [that] have been found to be 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”12 those “‘so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’”13 those without which 
“neither liberty nor justice would exist.”14  In its prior cases, the Court had 
included within that narrow category the rights to freedom of speech
15
 and of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8   See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
9   “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
10  302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
11  “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
12  Palko, 302 U.S. at 324–25. 
13  Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
14  Id. at 326. 
15  See id. at 324. 
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press,
16
 and the rights to the free exercise of religion
17 
and to peaceable assembly.
18
  
However, the Court had excluded many of the criminal procedure provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, such as the right to be indicted by a grand jury,
19
 the privilege 
against self-incrimination,
20
 the right to be free of unreasonable searches and 
seizures,
21
 and the right to confront one’s accusers at trial.22 
By 1947, only a decade after Palko, the Court was sharply split over whether 
to retain this “fundamental fairness” approach to due process.  In Adamson v. 
California, the issue was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated by a California law allowing the court and prosecutor to 
comment on the defendant’s decision not to testify at his trial.23  The Court, 
reaffirming its 1908 decision in Twining v. New Jersey,
24
 held that the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment
25
 did not apply to the States because 
“[t]he due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not draw all the 
rights of the federal Bill of Rights under its protection.”26 
But Justice Black, who had signed onto the Palko decision shortly after 
having joined the Court,
27
 had by this time acquired a different viewpoint.  Joined 
by Justice Douglas, he asserted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights and only the Bill of Rights.
28
  He 
defended this position largely on grounds of judicial restraint: keying the 
constraints that applied to the States to the provisions of the Bill of Rights kept 
judges from going at large with few guideposts in determining what incidents of 
the criminal process are required to render it “fundamentally fair.”29  Justice 
Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, filed a brief dissent agreeing with Justice 
Black “that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16  See id. 
17  See id. 
18  See id. 
19  See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1884). 
20  See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106, 111–12 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
21  See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
22  See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 261–62 (1904), overruled by Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
23  332 U.S. 46, 48–49 (1947), overruled by Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 619 (1965). 
24  211 U.S. 78 at 106, 111–112. 
25  “No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
26  Adamson, 332 U.S. at 53. 
27  See Michael J.Z. Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 79 n.139 (2002). 
28  See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69–92 (Black, J., dissenting).   
29  See id. at 69 (“This decision reasserts a constitutional theory . . . that this Court is endowed 
by the Constitution with boundless power under ‘natural law’ periodically to expand and contract 
constitutional standards to conform to the Court’s conception of what at a particular time constitutes 
‘civilized decency’ and ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice.’”).   
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intact into the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.”30  He differed with Justice Black only 
insofar as Justice Murphy believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not encompass only the rights included in the Bill of Rights.
31
 
Justice Frankfurter responded in a lengthy concurring opinion, defending the 
“fundamental fairness” regime.  He wrote: “The [Fourteenth] Amendment neither 
comprehends the specific provisions by which the founders deemed it appropriate 
to restrict the federal government nor is it confined to them.”32  Justice Frankfurter 
justified his position with reference to the text and legislative history of the 
Amendment.  He pointed out that it is difficult to read the text of the Due Process 
Clause as a stand-in for the entirety of the Bill of Rights.
33
  Moreover, Justice 
Frankfurter claimed that there was little evidence that those who framed and 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed they were imposing the Bill of Rights 
on the States.
34
  
Adamson and, in particular, the Frankfurter concurrence appeared to entrench 
the “fundamental fairness” approach.  In retrospect, however, Adamson represents 
the zenith of the fundamental fairness regime.  Four Justices rejected it in favor of 
strict incorporation; one more vote would mean the end of the “fundamental 
fairness” methodology.  In short order, that fifth vote appeared, along with several 
others for good measure.  In the span of only two decades, as Chief Justice Warren 
was poised to leave the Court, “fundamental fairness” was essentially dead.  As the 
Court wrote in Duncan v. Louisiana: 
 
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . now 
protects the right to compensation for property taken by the State; the 
rights of speech, press, and religion covered by the First Amendment; the 
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally 
seized; the right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
30  Id. at 124 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
31  Justice Murphy wrote: 
I am not prepared to say that the [Fourteenth Amendment] is entirely and necessarily 
limited by the Bill of Rights.  Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short 
of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional 
condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific 
provision in the Bill of Rights. 
Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting).  I have in the past differentiated between Justice Black’s and Justice 
Murphy’s positions, calling the former “total, exclusive incorporation” and the latter “total, non-
exclusive” incorporation.  See Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 79. 
32  Adamson, 332 U.S. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).   
33  See id. at 63 (“It would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey such specific 
commands in such a roundabout and inexplicit way.”). 
34  See id.at 64 (“It could hardly have occurred to these States that by ratifying the Amendment 
they uprooted their established methods for prosecuting crime and fastened upon themselves a new 
prosecutorial system.”). 
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compelled self-incrimination; and the Sixth Amendment rights to 
counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to confrontation of opposing 
witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.
35
 
 
And these provisions apply to the States in the exact same way they apply to 
the federal government.
36
 
The route from fundamental fairness to full-on incorporation provides the 
framework for the two paths with which this Article is concerned: from a spotty 
and inconsistent right to appointed counsel in state court to Gideon’s promise of 
appointed counsel in every serious criminal case; and from a nebulous right to be 
free from some uncertain amount of psychological pressure in the interrogation 
room to Miranda’s protocol of warnings and waiver in every case to dispel the 
inherent compulsion of interrogations. 
 
B. From Powell to Gideon 
 
The road to Gideon began with Powell v. Alabama.
37
  In that case, known 
colloquially as the “Scottsboro Boys” case,38 nine African-American youths had 
been accused of raping two young white women on a train traveling through 
Alabama.
39
  The defendants were ignorant, illiterate, and residents of other 
States.
40
  As one might imagine, given the place, time, and nature of the 
accusations, “the proceedings, from beginning to end, took place in an atmosphere 
of tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment,” and the defendants were kept 
under armed guard for their own safety.
41
 
The defendants were never asked if they wanted to attempt to secure counsel 
on their behalf or allowed the opportunity to communicate with family or friends 
who might do so for them.
42
  Instead, the trial judge appointed all the members of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
35  391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
36  See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 
929, 935 (1965) (“[T]he theory continues that once a particular provision of the Bill of Rights makes 
the grade for ‘absorption,’ it comes over to the states with all the overlays the Court has developed in 
applying it to the Federal Government . . . .”).  The only exception appears to be the jury-trial 
requirement of the Sixth Amendment, which arguably requires twelve-person juries and unanimous 
guilty verdicts in federal court but not in state court.  See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 356, 373–77 
(1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (providing fifth vote in support of judgment and 
opining that unanimity is required by Sixth but not Fourteenth Amendment); Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 86–103 (1970) (holding that twelve-person juries are not required by Fourteenth 
Amendment, without deciding whether they are required by the Sixth Amendment). 
37  287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
38  See, e.g., Michael Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 48, 51 (2000). 
39  See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49, 51. 
40  See id. at 52. 
41  Id. at 51. 
42  See id. at 52. 
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the local bar to represent the defendants jointly at their arraignment, and assumed 
that these counsel would continue to represent them at trial, which began six days 
later.
43
  At trial, the defendants in Powell were convicted and sentenced to death.
44
 
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the proceedings had violated 
the defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of life without due 
process of law.  Because the defendants essentially lacked counsel during the 
critical pre-trial period, the issue was whether they had a federal constitutional 
right to counsel at that time.  Incanting the language of the ascendant fundamental 
fairness regime, the Court framed the issue as whether “the right involved is of 
such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions.’”45  The Court held that the right to retain counsel during this period 
was protected by the Due Process Clause: “The right to be heard would be, in 
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by 
counsel.”46 
Importantly, the Court went even further.  Not only was the right to retain 
counsel an aspect of due process, but, under the circumstances, failure to appoint 
counsel for defendants unable to retain their own counsel would violate the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
47
  But the perfunctory 
appointment of the entire local bar during that period “even if made for all 
purposes” would not have sufficed.48  The undifferentiated appointment of every 
member of the local bar to represent them left the defendants without a single 
advocate charged with zealously representing their interests, and instead diluted 
that responsibility, leaving no particular attorney accountable to them.
49
  The Court 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
43  See id.at 50, 53, 56. 
44  See id.at 50. 
45  See id. at 67 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1927)). 
46  Id. at 68–69. 
47  See id. at 71 (“[U]nder the circumstances . . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and 
imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise 
a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
48  Id. at 56. 
49  See id. (“[I]n the very nature of things . . . they would not, thus collectively named, have 
been given that clear appreciation of responsibility or impressed with that individual sense of duty 
which should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a selected member of the bar, 
specifically named and assigned.”).  The Court’s intuition is supported by modern research on 
individual and group responsibility, the classic exposition being BIBB LATANÉ & JOHN M. DARLEY, 
THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN’T HE HELP? (1970).  Joint appointment of attorneys to 
represent the entire group of defendants simultaneously might have violated another norm associated 
with modern right-to-counsel rules: the right to un-conflicted counsel.  Because the seven defendants 
were alleged to be accomplices in the same incident, some might have defended by claiming that 
others in the group, but not they, had perpetrated the crime.  Under those circumstances, an attorney 
representing all the defendants would have had an intractable conflict of interest.  See Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978). 
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left open the question of how far this right of appointed counsel extended.
50
  
Indeed, the Court narrowly circumscribed the new rule it was propounding: 
 
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital 
case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable 
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court . . . to assign 
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . . .
51
 
 
Accordingly, not only was this latter portion of the Powell opinion dicta—the 
Court had already decided that the defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment rights had 
been violated because they had not been given adequate opportunity to secure 
counsel
52—but it was narrowly delineated dicta to boot.53  Nevertheless, Powell 
came to stand for the proposition that due process required appointment of counsel 
for an indigent state defendant in any capital case.
54
  The question remained 
whether and to what extent the Fourteenth Amendment required the appointment 
of counsel in non-capital cases as well. 
Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,
55
 the Court squarely rejected the claim that 
the appointment of counsel was required by the Due Process Clause in all felony 
cases.  Betts, charged with robbery in Maryland state court and unable to afford 
counsel, unsuccessfully requested that counsel be appointed to represent him.
56
  
After representing himself, he was found guilty and sentenced to eight years in 
prison.
57
  On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment required the appointment of counsel in every case where the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
50  See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 (“Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or 
under other circumstances, we need not determine.”). 
51  Id. 
52  See id. at 76 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“If correct, the ruling that the failure of the trial court 
to give petitioners time and opportunity to secure counsel was a denial of due process is enough, and 
with this the opinion should end.”). 
53  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]hese 
limiting facts were not added to the opinion as an afterthought; they were repeatedly emphasized, and 
were clearly regarded as important to the result.”) (citation omitted). 
54  See, e.g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 676 (1948) (“[T]his Court repeatedly has held that 
failure to appoint counsel to assist a defendant or to give a fair opportunity to the defendant’s counsel 
to assist him in his defense where charged with a capital crime is a violation of due process of law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 347 (Clark, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (observing that prior to Bute, there was “no language in any cases in th[e] Court indicating 
that appointment of counsel in all capital cases was required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
55  316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
56  Id. at 456–57. 
57  See id. at 457. 
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defendant is too poor to afford counsel.
58
  Only four years earlier, in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, the Court had held that the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment
59
 requires as much in federal cases.
60
  But the Betts Court rejected the 
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment contained the identical requirement.
61
  The 
Court wrote that due process is “less rigid and more fluid” than the provisions of 
the Bill of Rights, and “less a matter of rule.”62  Echoing Palko, it wrote that 
whether state action “constitute[d] a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to 
the universal sense of justice,” depended on the totality of facts of each case.63  
And pointing to the relative simplicity of the factual issues of Betts’ robbery case, 
as well as the fact that Betts was “forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence,” 
and had previous experience in the criminal justice system, the Court concluded 
that he had not been deprived of liberty without due process.
64
 
Although Betts itself did not use the term, it came to be understood as holding 
that there was a constitutional obligation on the part of a State to appoint counsel 
in a criminal case only where there were “special circumstances.”65  As Powell 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
58  See id. at 462 (“The petitioner . . . asks us, in effect, to apply a rule . . . . that, in every case, 
whatever the circumstances, one charged with a crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be 
furnished counsel by the state.”). 
59  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
60  304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (“The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all 
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he 
has or waives the assistance of counsel.”). 
61  See Betts, 316 U.S. at 461–62 (“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment . . . .”); see also Bute 
v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 675 (1948) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not . . . have the effect of 
requiring the several states to conform the procedure of their state criminal trials to the precise 
procedure of the federal courts . . . .”). 
62  Betts, 316 U.S. at 462. 
63  Id.; see also Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949) (“The due process clause is not 
susceptible to reduction to a mathematical formula.”); Bute, 333 U.S. at 649 (“[D]ue process . . . . has 
reference . . . to a standard of process that may cover many varieties of processes that are expressive 
of differing combinations of historical or modern, local or other juridical standards, provided they do 
not conflict with the ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions.’” (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1929))). 
64  Betts, 316 U.S. at 472–73. 
65  See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(describing Betts as having “admit[ted] of the possible existence of special circumstances in 
noncapital as well as capital trials, while at the same time insisting that such circumstances be shown 
in order to establish a denial of due process.”); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 135 (1951) (“[T]he 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to afford defendants assistance of 
counsel in non-capital criminal cases when there are special circumstances showing that without a 
lawyer a defendant could not have an adequate and fair defense.”); Bute, 333 U.S. at 677 (“In a 
noncapital state felony case, this Court has recognized the constitutional right of the accused to the 
assistance of counsel for his defense when there are special circumstances showing that, otherwise, 
the defendant would not enjoy that fair notice and adequate hearing which constitute the foundation 
of due process of law in the trial of any criminal charge.”). 
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came to be understood, capital charges constituted special circumstances in 
themselves.  In non-capital cases, the Court looked to such factors as “the gravity 
of the crime[,] . . . the age and education of the defendant, the conduct of the court 
or the prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature of the offense charged and 
the possible defenses thereto . . . . ”66  Thus, “special circumstances” fell into two 
general categories: those relating to the charges against the defendant, and those 
relating to the characteristics of the defendant himself. 
Over the course of the next twenty years, the Court decided at least twenty 
cases, an average of one per term, presenting the issue whether there were “special 
circumstances” requiring appointment of counsel.67  In a significant number of 
cases, in finding a due process violation, the Court relied on multiple factors 
without putting exclusive weight on one in particular.
68
  In Carnley v. Cochran, for 
example, the Court pointed to both the complexity of the statutory scheme, by 
which “two sets of Florida criminal statutes” arguably criminalized the defendant’s 
acts, and the fact that the defendant was illiterate.
69
  In Moore v. Michigan, the 
Court relied on the fact that the defendant was seventeen years old, had a seventh-
grade education, was charged with murder, and had several potentially full or 
partial defenses.
70
  And in McNeal v. Culver, the Court relied on an amalgam of 
defendant-specific facts, such as his mental illness, lack of education, and 
unfamiliarity with the criminal process, on the one hand, and trial-specific facts, 
such as the complexity of the Florida law of assault and the admissibility of the 
defendant’s confession on the other.71 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
66  Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948). 
67  See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 
(1962); McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); 
Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Massey v. Moore, 
348 U.S. 105 (1954); Palmer, 342 U.S. 134; Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Gibbs v. 
Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges, 335 U.S. 437; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Gryger v. 
Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 
(1948); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Rice 
v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 
U.S. 471 (1945). 
68  In a number of cases, the Court relied primarily on the age and inexperience of the 
defendant, coupled with particularly grave crimes punished by life in prison.  See Uveges, 335 U.S. at 
442 (“Petitioner was [seventeen years old] and inexperienced in the intricacies of criminal procedure 
when he pleaded guilty to crimes which carried a maximum sentence of eighty years.”); Marino, 332 
U.S. at 562 (State confessed error where defendant was eighteen years old, had been in country for 
only two years, did not speak English, pled guilty to murder, and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment); De Meerleer, 329 U.S. at 664–65 (finding due process violation where uncounseled 
seventeen year-old was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment); see 
also Wade, 334 U.S. at 683 (heavily deferring to federal district court’s factual finding “that Wade 
was an inexperienced youth incapable of adequately representing himself” on a charge carrying five 
years in prison). 
69  Carnley, 369 U.S. at 507–10, 511. 
70  Moore, 355 U.S. at 159–60. 
71  McNeal, 365 U.S. at 112. 
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Meanwhile, a number of Justices continued to press their claim that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights part 
and parcel.
72
  They attacked the “vague, fickle standard” of Betts, which “ha[d] 
served not to guide but to confuse the courts” by imposing “the perplexing 
responsibility of appointing lawyers for an accused when a trial judge believes that 
a failure to do so would be ‘shocking to the universal sense of justice.’”73 
Finally, in 1963, amidst the Warren Court’s incorporation revolution, the 
other shoe dropped.  Only a year earlier, the Court had held that the Eighth 
Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments”74 applies to the States by 
dint of the Fourteenth Amendment.
75
  And the year before that, the Court had 
incorporated the Fourth Amendment rule that illegally seized evidence must be 
excluded from the prosecutor’s case-in-chief at trial.76  Now, in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, the Court overruled Betts and unanimously held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s Assistance of Counsel Clause applied to the States via the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well.
77
  The court reasoned that, in any criminal case, 
“any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”78  In effect, as Justice Harlan put it in 
his concurrence, the Court “c[a]me to recognize . . . that the mere existence of a 
serious criminal charge constituted in itself special circumstances requiring the 
services of counsel at trial.”79 
 
C. From Brown to Miranda 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
72  See, e.g., Carnley, 369 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., 
concurring) (reiterating the “belief that the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the States the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.’” (alteration in original)); McNeal, 365 U.S. at 119 (Douglas, 
J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring) (“Betts v. Brady . . . should be overruled.”); Gibbs, 337 U.S. at 
782 (“Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS . . . think that Betts v. Brady should be 
overruled.”); Uveges, 335 U.S. at 440 (“Some members of the Court think that where serious offenses 
are charged, failure of a court to offer counsel in state criminal trials deprives an accused of rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Bute, 333 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, Murphy, 
and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting) (“[A] chief purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect the 
safeguards of the Bill of Rights against invasion by the states.”). 
73  See, e.g., Carnley, 369 U.S. at 518–19 (Black, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
74  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
75  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
76  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
77  372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (determining that “the Court in Betts was wrong . . . in 
concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of the[] fundamental rights” 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
78  Id. at 344. 
79  Id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Miranda shares many similarities with Gideon.  Like Gideon, Miranda’s roots 
are in the heavily racialized criminal justice system of the Deep South in the 
1930s.  Like Gideon, the road to Miranda was marked with fits and starts as the 
Court struggled to apply a nebulous, multi-factored standard that looked to both 
the objective circumstances and the characteristics of the individual.  And as in 
Gideon, the Miranda Court finally sought to cure the drawbacks of this standard 
by imposing a bright-line rule. 
The Supreme Court began regulating coercive interrogation tactics by state 
officials in 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi.
80
  In that case, three black sharecroppers 
were suspected of murdering their white landlord.
81
  The three confessed to the 
crimes only after having been severely whipped and told that the whipping would 
continue until they confessed.
82
  Their confessions were admitted into evidence 
against them at their trial for murder and constituted the only evidence of their 
guilt.
83
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State of Mississippi reminded the Court 
that it had held in Twining v. New Jersey nearly thirty years earlier that the Self-
Incrimination Clause did not apply to the States via the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
84
  The Court responded that 
 
[T]he question of the right . . . to withdraw the privilege against self-
incrimination is not here involved.  The compulsion to which [Twining] 
refer[red] is that of the processes of justice by which the accused may be 
called as a witness and required to testify.  Compulsion by torture to 
extort a confession is a different matter.
85
 
 
Invoking the “fundamental fairness” standard, the Court wrote that a State 
could withdraw the privilege but it could not “‘offend[] some principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”86  The Court held that the State’s actions were “revolting to the 
sense of justice,” and constituted “a wrong so fundamental that [they] made the 
whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and 
sentence wholly void.”87  Brown thus stands for the proposition that where a 
conviction is procured through a confession of the defendant obtained by physical 
violence, the defendant has been deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
80  297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
81  See id.  Although the races of the parties are not clear from the Court’s opinion, they are 
identified in other sources.  See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 38, at 51. 
82  Brown, 297 U.S. at 281–82. 
83  Id. at 279, 283. 
84  211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). 
85  Brown, 297 U.S. at 285. 
86  Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1905) (alteration added)). 
87  Id. at 286. 
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process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
88
 
The Court soon extended Brown to rule that confessions obtained through 
psychological coercion rather than physical force also could not be used to obtain a 
criminal conviction.  The Court famously wrote in Blackburn v. Alabama: 
 
[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and . . . the blood of the 
accused is not the hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition . . . .  [T]he 
efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched, given the 
proper subject, by more sophisticated modes of ‘persuasion.’  A 
prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignorant of his rights and 
who has been cut off from the moral support of friends and relatives is 
not infrequently an effective technique of terror.
89
 
 
The question in every case was whether the confession was truly the product 
of the suspect’s free will or if, instead, his or her free will had been “overborne.”90 
The Court was capable of articulating the standard in the simplest of terms: 
“The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure 
against the power of resistance of the person confessing.”91  The simplicity was 
deceptive.  As with the due process right-to-counsel inquiry, the due process 
coerced confession inquiry looked to two categories of factors.  First, the Court 
looked to the objective circumstances of the interrogation itself, such as the length 
and persistence of the questioning,
92
 any deprivation of sleep
93
 or food,
94
 any 
humiliating treatment of the suspect at the hands of the police,
95
 the holding of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
88  Id. at 285–86; accord Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (“Physical violence or 
threat of it by the custodian of a prisoner during detention serves no lawful purpose, invalidates 
confessions that otherwise would be convincing, and is universally condemned by the law.”), 
overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
89  361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (footnote omitted).  See also Jackson, 378 U.S. at 389 (“[P]olice 
conduct requiring exclusion of a confession has evolved from acts of clear physical brutality to more 
refined and subtle methods of overcoming a defendant’s will.”); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 
307 (1963) (“These standards are applicable whether a confession is the product of physical 
intimidation or psychological pressure . . . .”). 
90  Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961); see also Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 208 (question was 
whether the confession was “the product of a rational intellect and a free will”). 
91  Stein, 346 U.S. at 185. 
92  See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709, 711–12 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 
737, 739, 746–47, 752 (1966); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52, 55 (1962). 
93  See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1968); Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709, 712; 
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622 (1961) (plurality); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559–
60 (1954); Stein, 346 U.S. at 185; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (plurality); Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,153 (1940). 
94  See Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 521; Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709–10, 712; Davis, 384 U.S. at 746; 
Culombe, 367 U.S. at 622 (plurality); Reck, 367 U.S. at 441; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 
(1958). 
95  See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 622 (plurality); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405 (1945). 
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suspect incommunicado
96
 (particularly in foreign surroundings),
97
 whether the 
suspect was advised of his rights
98
 or taken before a magistrate,
99
 whether the 
suspect ever requested counsel,
100
 any potential for mob violence or extra-judicial 
punishment,
101
 threats of legal action against the suspect’s family members,102 and 
the extent to which sophisticated methods such as the “false friend” were 
employed during the interrogation.
103
  Second, the Court looked at the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the suspect, such as his age,
104
 his race,
105
 his 
education, intelligence, and socio-economic status,
106
 his prior experience with the 
criminal justice system,
107
 and his general physical and psychological state, 
including whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
108
   
As might be imagined, such an elusive test as the “overborne will” standard, 
by which multiple factors were relevant but none was dispositive, generated 
considerable criticism.
109
  Not only was the standard indeterminate based solely on 
the objective factors of the interrogation, but that indeterminacy was exacerbated 
by the fact that the question of coercion also depended on the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the suspect, many of which might not even be known to the 
police at the time of the interrogation.  Even Justice Frankfurter, who generally 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
96  See, e.g., Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968) (per curiam); Clewis, 386 U.S. 
at 712; Davis, 384 U.S. at 744–46; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 504 (1963); Gallegos, 370 
U.S. at 54–55; Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601 (plurality). 
97  See, e.g., Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709–10; Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 551, 555 (1942). 
98  See, e.g., Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 520–21; Clewis, 386 U.S. at 710–11; Davis, 384 U.S. at 
739, 740–41; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730–31 (1966). 
99  See, e.g., Clewis, 386 U.S. at 709; Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 55; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 
441 (1961); Payne, 356 U.S. at 567. 
100 See, e.g., Greenwald, 390 U.S. at 520–21; Johnson, 384 U.S. at 730–31; Haynes, 373 U.S. 
at 504. 
101 See, e.g., Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 401 (1958). 
102 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 
70 (1949).  
103 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959); Thomas, 356 U.S. at 402. 
104 See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 52–55 (1962); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 n.7 
(1960); Spano, 360 U.S. at 321. 
105 See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 712 (1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 
(1966); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940); 
see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 162 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court 
always has considered the confessor’s strength or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, 
intelligent or moronic, well or ill, Negro or white.”). 
106 See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 519 (1968); Clewis, 386 U.S. at 712. 
107 See Clewis, 386 U.S. at 712; Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534; Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441 
(1961); Spano, 360 U.S. at 321. 
108 See Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36–38 (1967); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 
(1963). 
109 See Reck, 367 U.S. at 455 (Clark, J., dissenting) (decrying “the elusive, measureless 
standard of psychological coercion heretofore developed in this Court by accretion on almost an ad 
hoc, case-by-case basis”); Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 163 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“No one can regard the 
rule of exclusion dependent on the state of the individual’s will as an easy one to apply.”). 
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supported the case-by-case accretion of doctrine so characteristic of the 
fundamental fairness methodology, had to acknowledge the drawbacks of the 
Court’s approach when he wrote for a plurality in 1962: “It is impossible for this 
Court, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely to delimit, or 
to surround with specific, all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation 
allowed to state law enforcement officers in obtaining confessions.”110  One can 
almost hear the weariness in Chief Justice Warren’s voice in the opening line of 
Spano v. New York, decided in 1959: “This is another in the long line of cases 
presenting the question whether a confession was properly admitted into evidence 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”111 
At the same time, the Justices who pressed for total incorporation provided a 
steady drumbeat of dissent from analyzing coercive interrogation as anything but a 
Self-Incrimination Clause issue.  Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, 
complained in dissent in 1953 that the Court had sanctioned a practice in “plain 
violation of the command of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States 
by the Fourteenth, that no man can be compelled to testify against himself.”112  
Only a year later, this view began to appear in majority opinions, when, in an 
opinion by Justice Black, the Court wrote: “[C]oerced confessions cannot be 
admitted as evidence in criminal trials.  Some members of the Court reach this 
conclusion because of their belief that the Fourteenth Amendment makes 
applicable to the states the Fifth Amendment’s ban against compulsory self-
incrimination.”113 
Finally, in 1964, a year after Gideon made the Assistance of Counsel Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court held in Malloy v. Hogan
114
 that the Self-Incrimination Clause applied to 
the States as well.  Although Malloy did not involve police interrogation, the case 
opened up the possibility of recognizing the Self-Incrimination Clause as the most 
textually appropriate home for a constraint on state interrogation practices.  Indeed, 
as the Court would later write: “The standard of voluntariness which has evolved 
in state cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
same general standard which applied in federal prosecutions—a standard grounded 
in the policies of the privilege against self-incrimination.”115  But while Malloy 
provided a textual hook for the Court’s regulation of police interrogations under a 
regime of incorporation, in and of itself the case provided no further doctrinal 
clarity.  After all, the question of whether a statement was “compelled” by 
interrogation tactics is no easier to answer than the question whether the statement 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
110 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
111 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959). 
112 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 208 (1953) (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 
113 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 n.3 (1954). 
114 378 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1964). 
115 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966). 
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was coerced. 
Two years later, the Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.
116
  The Court first 
canvassed various interrogation tactics that police use to extract confessions, such 
as positing the guilt of the suspect as a certainty, minimization of the seriousness 
of the offense and offering excuses or justifications for it, discouraging 
consultation with counsel, and engaging in trickery, such as the “good cop/bad 
cop” routine and rigged line-ups.117  Importantly, the Court never claimed that the 
use of these stratagems, alone or in combination, amounted to a due process 
violation.  Indeed, the Court noted that in the cases before it, the confessions might 
not have been coerced when measured by the conventional “overborne will” 
standard.
118
  However, the Court held that, in light of these tactics, when a suspect 
is interrogated in custody, “the privilege against self-incrimination is 
jeopardized.”119  Accordingly, the Court held, if the police want to secure 
admissible statements, they must, prior to obtaining such statements via custodial 
interrogation, administer the now-famous Miranda warnings and obtain a 
waiver.
120
 
As with Gideon, the decision in Miranda was intimately bound up in the 
Court’s incorporation project.  Incorporation of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
meant that pre-existing Fifth Amendment doctrine now applied to the States.
121
  
Generously interpreting its precedents in federal cases, particularly Bram v. United 
States,
122
 the Court found that it had “clearly establishe[d]” the application of the 
privilege “to incommunicado interrogation.”123  The court thus found “an intimate 
connection between the privilege against self-incrimination and police custodial 
questioning.”124  The Court concluded that, in both state and federal cases, “the 
privilege is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.”125 
The innovation of Miranda v. Arizona thus was, at least, twofold.  First, the 
decision broke ground in squarely placing police interrogation within the ambit of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause rather than—or, as we shall see, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
116 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
117 See id. at 449–54. 
118 See id. at 457 (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ statements to have been 
involuntary in traditional terms.”). 
119 Id. at 478. 
120 See id. at 478–79. 
121 See id. at 464 (observing that in the cases incorporating the Clause, the Court “applied the 
existing Fifth Amendment standards to the case before [it]”); see also id. at 464 n.33 (“The decisions 
of this Court have guaranteed the same procedural protection for the defendant whether his 
confession was used in federal or state court.”). 
122 See id. at 461 (“‘In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question 
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by [the Self-
Incrimination Clause].’” (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897)). 
123 Id. at 463. 
124 Id. at 458. 
125 Id. at 460–61. 
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in addition to—more general notions of due process.  Second, the decision put to 
one side the multitude of factors the Court had relied upon in the past in deciding 
whether confessions had been freely given.  Instead, the Court pointed to one 
overriding factor: the very fact of custodial interrogation.  The Court determined 
that in the atmosphere of custodial interrogation, compulsion to incriminate oneself 
is “inherent.”126  The Court held that the only way to dissipate this inherent 
compulsion, and thereby secure the admissibility of statements taken in custodial 
interrogation, is to warn the suspect of his or her rights and obtain a waiver of 
those rights.
127
  “The Miranda rule thus establishes a conclusive presumption that, 
without the appropriate warnings and waiver, any response by a suspect to 
custodial interrogation has been ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Self-
Incrimination Clause and therefore cannot be used against that suspect at trial.”128 
Yet the Court’s old due process voluntariness test survived Miranda.  “[E]ven 
after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogations, and is binding on 
the States, the Court has continued to measure confessions against the 
requirements of due process.”129  Thus, in cases where the dictates of Miranda do 
not apply because the suspect either is not in custody or is not being interrogated, 
courts must still measure the voluntariness of a resulting confession based on the 
old “overborne will” standard.130  More importantly, the due process voluntariness 
test also applies in those situations where the Miranda constraints have been 
satisfied: where the suspect has been read his rights and waives those rights.
131
  It 
is to that class of cases this Article will shortly turn. 
It will be helpful at this point to observe the many similarities between 
Gideon and Miranda.  As noted already, each jurisprudential line stems from an 
inter-racial crime from the highly racialized criminal justice system of the Deep 
South.  Each case follows a decades-long failed experiment in using a nebulous, 
multi-factored standard characteristic of the “fundamental fairness” method of 
interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Both 
standards looked to both the objective facts—the court proceedings on the one 
hand, and the interrogation on the other—and the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
the suspect or defendant.  Both standards were also retrospective in that they could 
be applied only after the fact: Given what occurred at trial, was the appointment of 
counsel a requirement of due process?  Given what occurred during the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
126 See id. at 458, 467. 
127 See id. at 444, 479. 
128 Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 71. 
129 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (“Over time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases 
for the requirement that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
130 See Mannheimer, supra note 27, at 71–72. 
131 See id. 
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interrogation, did the tactics amount to a deprivation of due process?  In each case, 
the experiment failed because the resulting standard led to inconsistent, arbitrary, 
and unpredictable results.  In each case, the multi-factored standard was replaced 
with a prospective, bright-line rule: state court judges must appoint counsel at the 
outset of every serious criminal case, and state police must provide warnings 
before custodial interrogation in order to obtain admissible statements.  And, 
finally, each rule can be stated as a conclusive presumption.  Gideon can be read as 
creating a conclusive presumption that the pendency “of a serious criminal charge” 
establishes the special circumstances required by Betts,
132
 and Miranda can be read 
as conclusively presuming that custodial interrogation is compulsive in the absence 
of warnings to dissipate the compulsion. 
 
III. THE UNDOING OF GIDEON AND MIRANDA 
 
Fifty years later, it is difficult to find anyone who thinks that either the Gideon 
or the Miranda story has a happy ending.  Rather, the conventional account is that 
both have been undone by later developments.  While there are several 
explanations for their undoing, the prime suspect in each case is the establishment 
of a presumption that runs counter to the conclusive presumption created by the 
case itself. 
 
A. The Undoing of Gideon: The Presumption of Attorney Competence 
 
To be sure, Gideon started out in a promising fashion.  It was a unanimous 
decision on a Court that included Justice Harlan, the last anti-incorporationist 
stalwart.  The result in Gideon was advocated by a unique amicus brief supported 
by the attorneys general of nearly half the States.
133
  In Gideon’s aftermath, Judge 
Friendly reported: “There is nigh unanimous applause for the insistence that 
persons charged with serious crime shall receive the assistance of counsel at their 
pleas and trials.”134  But that Gideon has been a failure is, at least among those in 
the know, not a proposition that requires defending but a given in need only of an 
explanation.
135
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
132 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
133 See Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So Rarely Defend the Rights of 
the Accused?, 122 YALE L.J. 2336, 2342 (2013). 
134 Friendly, supra note 36, at 931. 
135 See Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A 
Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 61 (1986) (recognizing that “the general opinion [is] that Gideon’s 
promise ‘rings hollow’ too often”); Donald A. Dripps, Up From Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 113, 
114 (2012) (“[T]he overwhelming weight of informed opinion[] is that Gideon has not succeeded in 
providing typical indigent defendants with a competent and vigorous defense.”); Lawrence C. 
Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 960 (2004) (“[D]espite the widespread 
acceptance of Gideon, there remains a systemic failure in many areas of the country to actually 
follow the essence of the ruling in Gideon.”). 
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There are two main culprits typically cited for the undoing of Gideon, one 
doctrinal and the other non-doctrinal.  The non-doctrinal explanation is the lack of 
political will at the state and local level to fully fund Gideon’s “unfunded 
mandate.”136  The result is that public defenders are underfunded137 and over-
worked.
138
  Low pay prevents some highly skilled attorneys from even considering 
working as public defenders.  And staggering caseloads often force the hardy few 
who go into criminal defense work to triage their cases in such a way that many 
indigent criminal defendants proceed through the system without adequate care 
paid to their cases.
139
 
These problems are only exacerbated in jurisdictions with no permanent 
public defender office, where indigent defense is handled by an individual 
appointment system.  Fee caps encourage lawyers to do less work on their cases in 
order to maximize their hourly wages.
140
  A “go along to get along” ethos 
sometimes prevails, where defense attorneys do not contest charges too vigorously 
and plead an inordinate number of cases in exchange (implicitly, of course) for 
more assignments.
141
  As repeat players in the process, defense attorneys in these 
systems might align their interests with prosecutors and judges in moving the 
system along, rather than with their clients in seeking the best possible case 
outcome.
142
 
As compelling as this non-doctrinal explanation is for the failure of Gideon, it 
hinges almost entirely on the doctrinal explanation: the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Strickland v. Washington.
143
  In Strickland, the Court set a low bar for appointed 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
136 Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2174 (2013) (“[M]ost state governments have treated the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gideon not as a bright star pointing the way to justice, but as an 
unfunded mandate to be resisted.”). 
137 See Dripps, supra note 3, at 924 (“Legislators have consistently failed to provide the levels 
of funding that would be required for even minimally adequate representation.”); see also Benjamin 
H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1251–52 
(2010) (canvassing instances of persistent underfunding of indigent defense). 
138 See Barton, supra note 137, at 1252 (“The funding problems lead inevitably to crippling 
caseloads.”); Dripps, supra note 3, at 901 (observing that “most defendants are prosecuted in 
jurisdictions” where caseloads greatly exceed the American Bar Association recommendations for 
maximum caseloads for defense attorneys). 
139 See generally John B. Mitchell, In (Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of “Triage” by Public 
Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 925 (2005); see also Barton, supra note 137, at 1253 (relating 
comment from public defender that caseload pressures require that attorneys limit their time to an 
average of “‘3.8 hours per case, including serious felony cases.’” (quoting Mary Sue Backus & Paul 
Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1058 
(2006))); Berger, supra note 135, at 61 (pointing to “the crushing caseloads of public defenders” as a 
reason for poor quality defense work); Dripps, supra note 3, at 890 n.30 (“Many, perhaps most, 
Strickland violations are mediated by caseload pressures.”). 
140 See Barton, supra note 137, at 1253.  
141 See id.  
142 See id. at 1254. 
143 466 U.S 668 (1984). 
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counsel to meet in order to be considered constitutionally effective.  It is Strickland 
that has been widely blamed for the perceived failure to live up to the promise of 
Gideon.
144
  The Strickland standard has permitted some “grossly incompetent” 
lawyering to pass constitutional muster in a not insubstantial number of cases.
145
  
Had the Court imposed a more stringent constitutional standard for the effective 
assistance of counsel, state convictions would more consistently be reversed and 
bounced back to state court for retrial.  Recalcitrant state and local governments 
would have little choice but to pony up the funds required to meet such a higher 
standard by paying public defenders more and hiring more of them.
146
  But because 
state legislators know that exceedingly few defendants will be able to show that 
their legal representation was so faulty as to satisfy the Strickland standard, they 
are secure in underfunding indigent criminal defense with few consequences.
147
  
Anyone who believes that Gideon has largely failed, therefore, must examine 
Strickland closely. 
Prior to Gideon, the Supreme Court had said little about the constitutional 
requirement of effective assistance of counsel even in cases where the defendant 
clearly had a right to counsel.  Powell made reasonably clear that effective 
assistance of counsel required sufficient time to prepare for trial, but in that case, 
as in Avery v. Alabama,
148
 the alleged lack of time to prepare was the fault of the 
court, not counsel.  In some early cases, the Court found a due process violation 
where the appointed attorney did not confer with the defendant until trial or 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
144 See Dripps, supra note 135, at 120 (“The Strickland standard is widely regarded as 
practically toothless.”); Dripps, supra note 3, at 899 (“Strickland has been the subject of sustained 
academic criticism since it came down.”); George C. Thomas, III, History’s Lesson for the Right to 
Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 546–47 (2004) (“The Court’s attempt to set standards in 
Strickland v. Washington is almost universally viewed as a failure.” (footnote omitted)). 
145 Marshall, supra note 135, at 968 (concluding that “grossly incompetent lawyers whom 
none of us would trust with traffic offenses are being entrusted with the lives and liberty of indigent 
defendants.”); Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 542 
(2009) (arguing that Strickland has led “courts [to] reject ineffectiveness challenges to a wide array of 
stunningly incompetent and unprofessional representation”). 
146 See Dripps, supra note 3, at 899 (“If the Supreme Court had adopted a robust standard of 
effective assistance, legislatures would have faced a forced choice between allocating dramatically 
more resources to indigent defense and scaling back the number of felony prosecutions.”); Smith, 
supra note 145, at 544 (“If, as is commonly supposed, ineffective representation is largely a function 
of the severe resource constraints the political process imposes on lawyers for indigent defendants, a 
toothless constitutional standard of effective representation . . . virtually invites legislatures to 
continue underfunding indigent defense.”). 
147 Barton, supra note 137, at 1259 (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel claims have hardly 
proven an effective protection against the individual woes of an underfunded, overburdened system 
of indigent defense.”); Dripps, supra note 3, at 903 (“Legislatures disinclined to fund indigent 
defense know that the failure to provide effective representation will lead to the reversal of few if any 
convictions.”); Smith, supra note 145, at 544 (“[A] more demanding ineffectiveness standard can 
help counteract the legislative strategy of using resource constraints [and] underfunding will no 
longer remain a cost-free strategy.”). 
148 308 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1940). 
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otherwise abandoned him.
149
  But the Court did not address cases involving less 
obvious forms of attorney error. 
However, the federal circuit courts did.  They uniformly adopted a standard 
for effective assistance based on the fundamental fairness methodology ascendant 
at the time, despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment directly applied in federal 
cases.  The courts reasoned that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed only counsel; 
effectiveness of counsel had to be measured by the dictates of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment in federal cases.
150
  Thus, the standard that was 
uniformly adopted
151
 was pitched in the language of the nebulous, totality-of-the-
circumstances standards of due process: counsel was ineffective only when his or 
her performance “shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings a 
farce and a mockery of justice.”152  This was a difficult test for defendants to meet, 
and courts routinely “rejected ineffective assistance of counsel claims unless 
counsel was grossly incompetent and provided intolerable representation.”153 
Subsequent to Gideon, and in the throes of full-on incorporation of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court began to send signals to the lower courts that the 
appropriate Sixth Amendment standard for effective assistance of counsel was not 
as onerous as the “farce and mockery” test.154  Eventually, every federal circuit 
court moved off the “farce and mockery” approach and adopted a standard less 
imbued with the rhetoric of “fundamental fairness” and “shocking to the 
conscience.”155  Yet differences in the details of the standards adopted by each 
court necessitated that the Supreme Court step in to clarify the Sixth Amendment 
standard.
156
  That clarification came in Strickland v. Washington.
157
 
In Strickland, the defendant, who pled guilty and was sentenced to death in 
Florida for three capital crimes, sought relief from his death sentences by claiming 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
149 See White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762–63 (1945) (attorney “refused to do anything for 
[the defendant] unless [he] had some money,” and refused to call a witness on the defendant’s behalf 
because counsel had another case to attend to.); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 276–77 (1945) 
(allegation that during the only pre-trial conferral between counsel and defendant, counsel tried to 
force defendant to plead guilty, then abandoned him when he refused). 
150 Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 13 (2009). 
151 See id. at 13–16. 
152 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).  See also Berger, supra note 135, at 
68 (“After-the-fact constitutional appraisal of attorney conduct rested solely on the vague, residual 
due process right to a fair trial.”). 
153 Chhablani, supra note 150, at 14. 
154 See id. at 19 (observing that “[t]he Court [in 1970] signaled that the ‘farce and mockery’ 
standard was too restrictive and that the right to effective assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth 
Amendment called for a different approach for measuring the adequacy of counsel's conduct.”). 
155 See id. at 21 (“[P]rior to the Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, every Circuit 
Court had adopted a Sixth Amendment-based approach to evaluating counsel's effectiveness.”). 
156 See id. at 21–34. 
157 466 U.S 668 (1984). 
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that he had not been provided the effective assistance of counsel.
158
  He asserted 
that various deficiencies of his appointed attorney led to his death sentence, 
including counsel’s failure to fully investigate possible character witnesses, to seek 
a pre-sentence report, to present effective arguments to the sentencing judge, to 
cross-examine the prosecution’s medical experts, and to request a psychiatric 
report for his client after he claimed he committed his crimes in a state of extreme 
stress.
159
 
Rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court set out the now-famous two-pronged 
analysis of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
 
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so 
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two 
components.  First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance 
was deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  This requires 
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
160
 
 
These prongs have come to be known as the “performance prong” and the 
“prejudice prong.”  The defendant must win on both prongs to gain relief.161 
The Court wrote that the touchstone for examining attorney performance, 
prong one, “is that of reasonably effective assistance,”162 which is to say 
“reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”163  The question is whether 
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”164  
Beyond that, the Court declined to articulate any detailed “checklist” to evaluate 
the effectiveness of counsel in any given case, in part because such an attempt 
would be fruitless in light of the endless “variety of circumstances faced by 
counsel” in the various types of cases counsel must address, and the variety of 
responses to that array of situations.
165
 
The Court also created a strong presumption for courts to engage in when 
assessing the performance prong, a presumption of attorney competence, which is 
to say that virtually any attorney will satisfy Gideon.  The Strickland Court wrote 
that “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
158 See id. at 675. 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 687. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 688. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 688–89. 
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the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”166  Later, the Court 
reiterated that “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate 
assistance.”167  If the Gideon presumption is that the existence of criminal charges 
against a defendant is itself a “special circumstance” requiring the assistance of 
counsel, then the presumption of attorney competence is a powerful counter-
presumption.  And this was no rhetorical flourish; it was a critical part of the 
opinion.
168
 
To the extent that Strickland is responsible for what is widely perceived as a 
failure to live up to the promise of Gideon, some have suggested that the 
performance prong of Strickland with its presumption of attorney competence has 
done a great deal of the harm.
169
  An empirical study of Strickland claims in the 
federal circuit courts as of May 1988 found that nearly a third of such claims were 
rejected solely because Strickland’s performance prong had not been satisfied.170 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
166 Id. at 689. 
167 Id. at 690.  The Court also repeatedly articulated this presumption in terms of the 
“deference” to be given counsel.  See id. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 
highly deferential.”); id. at 691 (instructing courts to “apply[] a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments”). 
168 Berger, supra note 135, at 82 (“[T]he majority alluded constantly to the stated presumption 
of counsel competence.”).  To be sure, circuit courts prior to Strickland had spoken of a presumption 
of attorney competence.  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 
1948) (“Whenever the court in good faith appoints or accepts the appearance of a member of the bar 
in good standing to represent a defendant, the presumption is that such counsel is competent.  
Otherwise, he would not be in good standing at the bar and accepted by the court.”).  However, the 
presumption was never stated in such a way as to make it virtually irrebuttable.  Rather, it appears 
that this presumption of attorney competence was established merely to make clear that the defendant 
bore the burden of proving an ineffectiveness claim.  See Maye v. Pescor, 162 F.2d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 
1947) (“Counsel appointed by a court to represent an accused is presumed to be competent, and the 
burden rests upon the petitioner to prove such incompetency.”); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668 
(D.C. Cir. 1945) (“We must assume that the court appointed a reputable member of the bar in whom 
it had confidence.”). 
169 See Smith, supra note 145, at 522 (“Here is where the Court seriously undermined the ideal 
of effective representation.”). 
170 See Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based 
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 458 app. I 
(1988) (finding that 32.34% of claims fell into this category).  This is not to downplay the purported 
defects of the prejudice prong.  The mischief of the prejudice prong is that it places the burden of 
proof, and thus the burden of uncertainty, on the defendant rather than on the prosecution.  This is 
contrary to conventional harmless error analysis, which places the burden on the prosecution once 
constitutional error has been shown.  See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding 
that “the beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”).  This shifting of the burden is 
problematic, for even in cases where defendants can satisfy the court that counsel performed below a 
standard of reasonable competence, uncertainty, ambiguity, or silence in the record will mean that 
prejudice has not been established and the defendant will lose.  Presumably, in many cases, a 
defendant who loses on the prejudice prong would also lose pursuant to a more conventional 
harmless error analysis.  But concededly, in some unknown number of cases, the burden-shifting of 
Strickland’s prejudice prong affects the outcome.  On the other hand, a presumption is necessary 
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To understand the mischief wrought by the presumption of attorney 
competence embedded in the performance prong, imagine a defendant who can 
actually demonstrate that the outcome would have been different but for the 
attorney’s errors.  Such a defendant will still lose unless he or she can overcome 
the presumption of attorney competence.  As Professor George Thomas put it: 
 
Because a defendant must meet both prongs of Strickland, some 
defendants whose lawyer cost them a probable acquittal will not be 
permitted a new trial because a reviewing court will find the overall 
representation not bad enough to rebut the resumption of 
reasonableness. . . .  Strickland thus sanctions, under the Sixth 
Amendment, a system in which lawyers literally cost their clients an 
acquittal.
171
 
 
The presumption of attorney competence operates as a sort of “rational basis” 
test, signaling to lower courts that they should reject ineffectiveness claims so long 
as there is “any conceivable basis for rationalizing the attorney’s actions.”172  This 
is true even if that post hoc rationalization obviously never occurred to the 
attorney.  The presumption of attorney competence thus insulates “all but the most 
deeply flawed convictions” from reversal.173 
Professor Stephen Smith has shown how the application of the Court’s newly-
minted standard in Strickland itself operated in this fashion.  Although the trial 
attorney had argued to the sentencing judge that the defendant should not receive 
the death penalty because he was under significant emotional distress at the time of 
the crime, the attorney’s failure to back up that argument with evidence that might 
have been obtained via expert psychiatric testimony was not deficient, the Court 
reasoned, because it was an acceptable strategy to focus on the defendant’s 
acceptance of responsibility.
174
  Yet, that was not the attorney’s strategy at all, for 
he “actually argued emotional distress.”175  The Strickland counter-presumption 
                                                                                                                                                   
because the burden of proof must lie with someone.  Thus, the Strickland Court’s prejudice prong is 
questionable, not because it creates a presumption, but because of the nature of that presumption. 
171 Thomas, supra note 144, at 553. 
172 Smith, supra note 145, at 520–21; see Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and 
After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6 (“Strickland 
winds up being almost as toothless as rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, which 
also rests on post hoc rationalizations instead of actual reasons.”); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the 
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 
1858 (1994) (“Errors in judgment and other mistakes may readily be characterized as ‘strategy’ and 
‘tactics’ and thus are beyond review.”). 
173 Thomas, supra note 144, at 547; see also Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, 
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
59, 78 (1986) (observing that the presumption of attorney competence “virtually mandates that 
reviewing courts find that most defense attorneys, no matter what they have done or failed to do, are 
competent”). 
174 See Smith, supra note 145, at 521–22. 
175 Id. at 522. 
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thus allows courts to treat the word “strategy” as a talismanic device to justify 
virtually any deficiency in counsel’s performance.176  “[T]he presumption of 
[attorney] competence serves to mask what in many cases are not ‘tactical choices’ 
but simple blunders.”177 
The presumption of attorney competence thus constrains judicial discretion.  
It largely precludes judges from determining whether the attorney actually had 
some strategy in mind at the time of his or her action or inaction and, if so, whether 
that strategy was consistent with prevailing professional norms.  Yet we generally 
conceive of the judge’s role, not as “requiring reflexive deference to claimed 
exercises of strategic judgment,” but as “demand[ing] that judges carefully probe 
claims of ‘strategy’ for accuracy (as an account of counsel’s actual thought process 
at the time of the challenged decision) and reasonableness in light of the 
circumstances of the case.”178  The presumption of attorney competence requires 
judges to pass on ineffectiveness claims without performing this careful, probing 
work.  This constraint of judicial discretion simplifies the judicial role, but at the 
cost of denying real scrutiny to questionable decisions or non-decisions by trial 
attorneys, a cost that is ultimately borne by their indigent clients 
At the same time, the presumption of attorney competence sends exactly the 
opposite signal to defense counsel, the other set of institutional actors to which it is 
addressed.  Far from constraining their conduct, Strickland, for them, is liberating.  
The presumption of attorney competence ensures counsel that their decisions will 
not be second-guessed except in the most extreme and rare cases.  In effect, this 
presumption provides “safe harbor,” and a quite roomy one at that.  So long as 
their conduct can be rationalized later as the product of strategy, it will not be 
questioned. 
Recent empirical work leads to the sobering conclusion that we may have, in 
essence, come full circle from Betts.  The touchstone of the cases decided under 
the Betts regime was whether a defendant could be thought to adequately defend 
himself from the forces of the state without a lawyer.  The results under that 
regime were mixed, and the Court sometimes—not often, but sometimes—
concluded that a defendant was at least as well off going it alone.
179
  Gideon 
foreclosed that conclusion by declaring categorically that a counseled defendant 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
176 Id. (asserting that Strickland permits lower courts “to insulate [attorney] judgments against 
judicial scrutiny by uttering the magic words of ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’”). 
177 Dripps, supra note 3, at 902. 
178 Smith, supra note 145, at 538. 
179 See, e.g., Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660, 665–66 (1950) (finding no constitutional 
violation where defendant pled guilty without asking for counsel and where there was no evidence he 
was ignorant of his statutory right to counsel); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948) (finding no 
constitutional violation where sentencing court might have misconstrued statute as providing for 
mandatory life sentence rather than leaving discretion with judge); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 
670–74 (1948) (finding no constitutional violation where charges of child molestation were relatively 
simple, no indication of a good defense appeared on the record, and defendant never requested 
counsel). 
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would always receive a fairer trial than an uncounseled one.  But Professor Erica 
Hashimoto’s work on pro se defendants suggests that this categorical claim was 
incorrect: her empirical study strongly suggests that pro se defendants charged 
with felonies in state court fare no worse than defendants represented by counsel, 
and indicates that some pro se defendants actually do better.
180
  It may be that 
counseled defendants did better in more complex cases.
181
  But, importantly, it is 
this class of cases where a right to counsel ought to have been found when Betts 
was properly applied.  This suggests not that Gideon was incorrect
182
 but that the 
quality of counsel under the Strickland regime is so spotty that many defendants 
would be at least as well off—and some would be better off—if Gideon had never 
been decided.
183
 
 
B. The Undoing of Miranda: The Presumption of Non-Coercion 
 
Miranda was, from the outset, a less promising decision than Gideon.
184
  The 
Court divided 5-4, and the dissenters predicted that the decision signaled the end to 
the highly useful crime-fighting tool of custodial interrogation.
185
  Even politicians 
soon got in on the act.  Miranda, they said, handcuffed the police and represented 
illegitimate legislating from the bench.
186
  It is no over-statement to say that 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
180 See Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at 
the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447–50 (2007); see also Dripps, supra note 135, 
at 124 (citing Hashimoto’s work for same proposition). 
181 See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro 
Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 992 (2012) (“Hashimoto's research indicates that 
lawyers appear to add less value in simple misdemeanor cases than in more complex and serious 
cases.” (citing  Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 461, 496 (2007))). 
182 See Hashimoto, supra note 180, at 477 (“If pro se defendants do just as well without 
counsel, does it follow that Gideon overrated the importance of counsel?  I think not.”). 
183 See Dripps, supra note 135, at 124 (interpreting Hashimoto’s findings to suggest that 
appointed counsel are ineffective in a sufficiently large number of cases to make it advantageous for 
many defendants to handle their cases pro se).  Of course, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 834 (1975), every competent defendant has the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to defend 
himself.  However, Gideon’s promise of counsel may provide a false sense of security to some 
defendants who would be better off going it alone but who do not realize it. 
184 See Dripps, supra note 135, at 115 (“[I]n marked contrast to Miranda, Gideon has never 
been controversial.”); Marshall, supra note 135, at 960 (observing that “of all the major criminal 
justice decisions of the Warren Court, Gideon is the one that no one seeks to overrule,” while 
“Miranda remains unpopular in many circles”). 
185 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., joined by Harlan and 
Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Court . . . for all practical purposes forbids interrogation except in the 
presence of counsel.”); id. at 516 n.12 (observing that “‘[a]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the 
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.’” (quoting 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (alteration added)). 
186 See, e.g., LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 248 (1983) (recounting 
Richard Nixon’s use of Miranda in 1968 presidential campaign). 
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Miranda is one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions of all time.
187
  
But the Miranda rule today is typically criticized at least as much by liberals who 
claim it does too little as by conservatives who claim it does too much.
188
  How did 
we get here? 
Miranda differed from Gideon in at least one respect relevant here: it is not 
difficult to nail down when the Gideon conclusive presumption applies.  To be 
sure, there were some initial questions over how serious a criminal offense had to 
be for the Gideon right to kick in.  But once the Court ruled in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin that counsel had to be provided before a defendant could be deprived of 
liberty,
189
 that issue was put to rest.  By contrast, the bright-line rule of Miranda 
spawned a series of issues that could be addressed using only nebulous standards.  
The conclusive presumption of coercion applies only where there is (1) custody, 
(2) interrogation, and (3) absence of waiver.  The Court fell back on fuzzy, totality-
of-the-circumstances-informed standards to address each of these issues.  There is 
custody where “a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated 
with formal arrest.’”190  There is interrogation where there is “either express 
questioning or . . . any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect.”191  And waiver need not be explicit but can be “implied from all the 
circumstances.”192 
One can thus criticize the Court’s Miranda jurisprudence for falling back on 
fuzzy standards in determining when the Miranda conclusive presumption applies.  
But to quibble about the amorphous nature of the edges of the Miranda rule risks 
ignoring the more fundamental criticism of Miranda: even where it indisputably 
applies, it is arguably ineffective in furthering its stated goal of “giv[ing] concrete 
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.”193  
To understand why, one must first realize that reliable studies have shown that 
something on the order of four out of every five suspects waive their Miranda 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
187 See Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1026 (2001) (characterizing Miranda as “one of the most well-known and 
controversial Supreme Court decisions in American history”). 
188 Compare Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor 
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174 (1988) (arguing that Miranda is an illegitimate exercise of judicial 
power) with Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1524 (2008) 
(“[L]ittle is left of Miranda’s vaunted safeguards and what is left is not worth retaining.”). 
189 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[N]o person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether 
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). 
190 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 
1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). 
191 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
192 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010). 
193 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).  Of course, Miranda may have been more 
successful in advancing other goals such as, most obviously, giving suspects notice of their rights 
pursuant to the Self-Incrimination Clause, as incorporated.  I focus here on the Court’s mission, 
stated in its explanation for the grant of certiorari, of providing clear standards for police and courts. 
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rights at the outset of custodial interrogation
194
 and do not later invoke those rights 
during the interrogation.
195
  Thus, vis-à-vis these eighty percent, Miranda neither 
advances nor impedes the goal of providing “concrete constitutional guidelines” 
for the conduct of interrogations.  It simply returns a suspect to the status quo ante 
Miranda.  That is to say, these eighty percent of suspects who waive their rights 
are still supposedly protected by the Court’s due process jurisprudence.196 
But there’s the rub.  Once a suspect waives his or her Miranda rights, the 
Miranda “counter-presumption”197 kicks in and any ensuing statements will almost 
invariably be deemed to have been freely given.  This counter-presumption seems 
to have first appeared in the Supreme Court doctrine as a throwaway line in 
Berkemer v. McCarty.  The Court there observed that one of the goals of Miranda 
was to “as much as possible free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual 
cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were 
voluntary.”198  The Court then dropped a footnote explaining the effect of the 
rendition of Miranda warnings on a later claim of coerciveness: “We do not 
suggest that compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness 
of a subsequent confession.  But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable 
argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that 
the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”199 
This curious dictum has been treated as a normative gloss on the doctrine.  
That is to say, the Berkemer dictum has come to be seen not as an innocuous 
empirical claim but as an instruction to lower courts that compliance with Miranda 
ordinarily should insulate later statements from allegations of coercion.
200
  The 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
194 See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Inside the 
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 282–83 (1996). 
195 See William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) (citing studies 
that show that “invocation during questioning is rare”). 
196 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 745 (1992) (“In 
theory . . . Miranda did no more than add an additional layer of protection for defendants without 
depriving them of the right to raise voluntariness claims even if the police had complied with the 
Miranda requirements.”); Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation 
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1218 (2001) (“[O]nce the suspect validly waives his Miranda 
rights, the due process voluntariness test provides the only restriction on police interrogation 
practices.”). 
197 See George C. Thomas III, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE 
J. L. & HUMAN. 79, 102 (1993). 
198 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984). 
199 Id. at 433 n.20. 
200 See Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law 
and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 810 (2006) (“If Miranda warnings were provided and 
waived prior to the confession, the confession is seen as presumptively voluntary.”); Patrick A. 
Malone, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent”: Miranda After Twenty Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 
378 (1986) (“[W]hen it has been concluded that a suspect waived his rights voluntarily, courts have 
often leaned on this finding to conclude that the entire subsequent interrogation was properly 
conducted, even though that is supposed to remain a separate inquiry.”); Seidman, supra note 196, at 
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dictum was ratified by the Court in Dickerson v. United States,
201
 and a plurality of 
the Court more recently put its imprimatur on this reading, explaining that “giving 
the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of 
admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after 
warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina.”202  This 
presumption of non-coercion instructs lower courts, in the overwhelming run of 
cases, to admit statements resulting from interrogations without having to address 
the underlying question of voluntariness,
203
 which remains as convoluted as it was 
pre-Miranda.
204
  Instead, the focus is on whether the simple and formulaic 
Miranda requirements have been met.
205
  It may even be that “lower courts 
conflate the test for determining a valid Miranda waiver with the test for 
determining a voluntary confession because the tests are so similar.”206  In 2001, 
Professor Welsh White found that, over the course of the previous two years, there 
were only five reported cases in which a defendant made a successful federal due 
process challenge to a confession following a Miranda waiver.
207
 
This instruction to the courts, in turn, becomes a guarantee of sorts to the 
police.  The presumption of non-coercion, in effect, provides police with “‘a safe 
                                                                                                                                                   
744–45 (“The warning-and-waiver ritual that is at Miranda’s core serve[s] to insulate the resulting 
confessions from claims that they were coerced or involuntary.”); Thomas, supra note 197, at 102 
(“Th[e] emphasis on what the warnings can achieve creates, in effect, a counter-presumption that 
gives [the police] a regular, routine way to demonstrate that . . . any resulting confession is 
admissible.”); White, supra note 196, at 1217 (“Miranda provides virtually no restrictions . . . on 
interrogation practices employed after waivers are obtained.”). 
201 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000). 
202 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (plurality); accord Weisselberg, supra 
note 188, at 1595. 
203 See Leo, supra note 187, at 1026 (asserting that Miranda “lull[s] judges into admitting 
confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness”); Seidman, supra note 196, at 745–46 (“[M]any 
lower courts have adopted an attitude toward voluntariness claims that can only be called cavalier.”); 
White, supra note 196, at 1220 (“A finding that the police have properly informed the suspect of his 
Miranda rights . . . often has the effect of minimizing or eliminating the scrutiny applied to post-
waiver interrogation practices.”). 
204 White, supra note 196, at 1218 (“[T]he post-Miranda due process test is essentially 
identical to the pre-Miranda test.”). 
205 See Leo, supra note 187, at 1025 (“Virtually all observers seem to agree that Miranda has 
shifted the legal inquiry from whether the confession was voluntarily given to whether the Miranda 
rights were voluntarily waived.”); Malone, supra note 200, at 377 (“Staccato Miranda conversations, 
with their uniform statements and check-the-box answers, are easier for courts to evaluate than 
sprawling hours-long interrogation.”). 
206 White, supra note 196, at 1220.  This would likely be an acceptable approach where a 
waiver occurs not at the outset of the interrogation but during the interrogation itself, as in Berghuis 
v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).  In that case, the Court held that the suspect’s confession—the 
word “yes” in answer to a question—could also serve double duty as his waiver of Miranda rights.  
See id. at 2257, 2262.  In such a case, the question of whether the waiver was voluntary would 
presumably be exactly the same question as whether the confession was voluntary.  However, such 
cases are probably rare. 
207 See White, supra note 196, at 1219–20 & n.54.  In four additional cases, defendants were 
able to successfully challenge confessions on state due process grounds.  See id.  
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harbor: if they follow[] the rules, they ha[ve] a fair assurance that a confession 
[will] be admissible.’”208  Worse still, the presumption of non-coercion might 
actually embolden police to act in ways that might, in an earlier generation, have 
been deemed coercive.  This is because “once the police give the Miranda 
warnings and obtain a waiver, they can engage in conduct that actually violates the 
Constitution, and neither the defendant nor the court is likely to stop them.”209 
Anecdotal evidence supports this concern.  Professor Louis Seidman cited “an 
especially egregious example” of a lower court finding a confession voluntary after 
Miranda had been satisfied where a suspect was intellectually and mentally 
disabled, and was threatened by the police with electrocution.
210
  Patrick Malone 
cited a Mississippi case where the court, in denying suppression, relied on the fact 
that the suspect had been given Miranda warnings, but the suspect was “a twenty-
seven-year-old man with a second-grade education, a tested IQ of from 54 to 60, 
and organic brain disease” and “confessed on the third day of interrogation.”211  As 
one student commentator put it, it “may well be that the police are freer to use 
coercive tactics now than they were before” Miranda.212  Miranda’s counter-
presumption thus “furnishe[s] law enforcement with a potent weapon to sanitize 
otherwise questionable confessions.”213  The simplification of the law that Miranda 
sought, among its other goals, has come to fruition but it has been achieved on the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
208 Weisselberg, supra note 188, at 1595 (quoting CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING 
THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (alteration added)); see also Thomas, 
supra note 197, at 102 (“The most significant effect of Miranda, ironically, may be to make police 
interrogation a more certain enterprise; even if some confessions are lost because suspects 
occasionally act on the warnings and remain silent, the confessions that are taken by complying with 
Miranda are virtually guaranteed to be admitted into evidence.”). 
209 John F. Stinneford, The Illusory Eighth Amendment, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 437, 472–73 
(2013); see also Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1434 n.90 (1985) 
(“Because the prosecution usually can prove the voluntariness of the waiver more easily than it can 
prove the voluntariness of the confession, the exchange of fourteenth amendment for fifth 
amendment protection has resulted in a net diminution of rights.”); Leo, supra note 187, at 1025 
(noting that some “suggest[] that as long as Miranda warnings were given, courts ignored 
interrogation misconduct, freeing the police to coerce suspects as long as they had first Mirandized 
them”). 
210 Seidman, supra note 196, at 746 n.241. 
211 Malone, supra note 200, at 378. 
212 James T. Thomas, Note, Police Use of Trickery as an Interrogation Technique, 32 VAND. 
L. REV. 1167, 1181 (1979). 
213 Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant? 10 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 461, 478 (1998); see also Malone, supra note 200, at 378 (“Miranda in many instances has been 
used to draw a shroud over the criminal interrogations that the decision was intended to bring into the 
open.”). 
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backs of criminal defendants.
214
  Little wonder, then, that police and prosecutors 
have learned to live with Miranda.
215
 
Moreover, the presumption of non-coercion perversely provides the least 
protection from coercion for suspects who are the most in need of it.  Presumably, 
the twenty percent or so of suspects who invoke their Miranda rights are the 
savviest, the best educated, the most experienced in the criminal justice system, or, 
at the least, the most capable of standing firm in the presence of authority figures.  
Since all of these factors enter into the calculus of coercion, interrogations of the 
meeker eighty percent or so, all other things being equal, are more likely to be 
coercive than interrogations of the hardier twenty percent would be.
216
 
On one level, the presumption of non-coercion makes sense.  Given that the 
suspect is armed with the knowledge that he or she can stop the interrogation at 
any time, perhaps we should heavily presume that the interrogation was not 
coercive if the suspect voluntarily chose to continue.
217
  After all, as the Supreme 
Court wrote in a related context, “it seems self-evident that one who is told he is 
free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his 
answers were compelled.”218  On the other hand, what we might identify as 
coercion from a perspective exogenous to the interrogation might not seem 
coercive when viewed from inside the suspect’s head.  Courts appear most likely to 
view an interrogation as coercive, for example, when police lie to a suspect in a 
way that is likely to lead him or her to sacrifice his privilege for seemingly greater 
concerns.
219
  In such a situation, knowledge of the privilege is obviously useless.  
And, more generally, the whole point of police use of deception is that the suspect 
does not know he or she is being deceived. 
In any event, my goal is neither to attack nor defend either the presumption of 
attorney competence or the presumption of non-coercion, but only to identify them 
and situate them within the larger context of the incorporation debate.  It is to the 
latter project that this Article now turns. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
214 See Leo, supra note 187, at 1025 (“The cost of this simplification . . . appears to be borne 
by the accused.”). 
215 See Thomas, supra note 197, at 102 (“[W]hile police and prosecutors were initially 
outraged by Miranda, they rather quickly dropped their opposition and now seem quite content with 
the Miranda doctrine.”); see also Malone, supra note 200, at 377 (“[T]he shift in focus has proven to 
be a boon to police.”). 
216 Cf. Garcia, supra note 213, at 474 (“The irony of Miranda lies in the majority’s recognition 
that a suspect who does not ask for counsel is the person most in need of a lawyer’s assistance.”). 
217 See Malone, supra note 200, at 377 (“When a suspect says yes, he understands his Miranda 
rights, and yes, he waives them, he is generally taken at his word . . . .”). 
218 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977). 
219 See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 8 N.E.3d 308, 314–15 (N.Y. 2014) (finding coercion in large 
part because police repeatedly told suspect that “his disclosure of the circumstances under which he 
injured his child was essential to assist the doctors attempting to save the child's life” when police 
knew the child was already brain dead). 
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IV. THE MIRANDA AND STRICKLAND COUNTER-PRESUMPTIONS  
AS THE PRODUCTS OF THE WARREN COURT’S INCORPORATION PROJECT 
 
The conventional account of the trajectory of Gideon and Miranda relies on a 
simple political explanation: conservative backlash against what was perceived by 
some as the liberal excesses of the Warren Court.  As Professor Donald Dripps has 
written: “The basic liberal narrative about constitutional criminal procedure 
celebrates the Warren Court’s project of reforming the criminal process to advance 
liberty and equality, and condemns the Supreme Court’s pro-prosecution turn in 
the years since Warren’s retirement in 1969.”220  Not only did the Court become 
more hostile to claims by defendants in criminal cases generally, but this hostility 
manifested itself in the Strickland and Miranda counter-presumptions in particular. 
However, this political explanation is incomplete.  To be sure, it would be 
naïve to think that politics had nothing to do with the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts’ cutting back on some of the landmark decisions of the 1960s, particularly 
Miranda.  But this conventional explanation for the Strickland and Miranda 
counter-presumptions overlooks the fact that both were endorsed by liberal and 
conservative Justices alike.  Remember that the Court first put its imprimatur on 
the Miranda counter-presumption in Berkemer v. McCarty, a unanimous decision 
penned by Justice Thurgood Marshall,
221
 probably the most vocal defender of 
Miranda on the Court.
222
  The Berkemer dictum was later endorsed wholeheartedly 
by a majority in 2000 that included all members of the Court except Justices Scalia 
and Thomas.
223
  And it gained even more traction when the four most liberal 
members of the Court in 2004 declared with apparent approval that “giving the 
warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of 
admissibility.”224 
Strickland, too, cut across ideological lines.  It was an 8-1 decision, with only 
Justice Marshall in dissent.
225
  Even liberal Justice William Brennan joined the 
majority opinion, dissenting only from the judgment because it ratified a state 
death sentence.
226
  Indeed, he wrote separately to emphasize his belief that 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
220 Dripps, supra note 3, at 902. 
221 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984). 
222 For example, Justice Marshall was the lone dissenter, joined not even by his usual liberal 
companion Justice Brennan, in both Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding that 
answers to routine booking questions are admissible even if not preceded by Miranda warnings and 
waiver), and Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that answers to questions by 
undercover agent in custodial setting are admissible even if not preceded by Miranda warnings and 
waiver). 
223 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 454 (2000). 
224 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (plurality). 
225 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 668 (1984). 
226 See id. at 701 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I join the Court’s 
opinion but dissent from its judgment.  Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all 
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Strickland would “provide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual 
ineffectiveness of counsel.”227 
The Miranda and Strickland counter-presumptions cannot be understood 
solely in crass political terms.  Rather, they were at least in part the product of the 
Warren Court’s incorporation project.  Again, by the time Earl Warren stepped 
down as Chief Justice, incorporation was fairly complete.  The fundamental 
fairness methodology was on life support, and when Justice John Harlan, its last 
great defender, left the Court in 1971, the plug was pulled. 
Incorporation ushered in an era of rules over standards.  But rules, the 
hallmark of incorporation, can rarely if ever displace standards.  When standards 
pop up again in a different place or form, further rules are required in an attempt to 
displace them.  The Miranda and Strickland counter-presumptions are best 
understood as “scaffolding” rules created to buttress the primary rules established 
in Miranda and Gideon.  Moreover, these two counter-presumptions were the only 
reasonably possible options under an incorporationist regime. 
 
A. Step One: From Standards to Rules 
 
Legal directives differ in the extent to which they provide clear guidelines to 
the actors to whom they are primarily directed and to the decision-makers who 
later evaluate the conduct of these actors.  As one travels on the spectrum from less 
to greater clarity and definiteness, one goes from standards to rules.
228
  Keeping in 
mind that there is no sharp dichotomy between rules and standards but only points 
on a continuum,
229
 we can use Professor Kathleen Sullivan’s helpful taxonomy on 
rules and standards.  “A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decision-
maker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering 
facts.”230  A rule seeks to encapsulate the essence of the animating principle of the 
legal directive but it displaces that principle inasmuch as it directs the decision-
maker to follow and apply the rule itself, not its animating principle.
231
  By 
contrast, “[a] legal directive is ‘standard’-like when it tends to collapse decision-
making back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a 
                                                                                                                                                   
circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I 
would vacate respondent’s death sentence . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
227 Id. at 702. 
228 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57–58 (1992). 
229 See id. at 58 n.231 (“[T]he rule/standard distinction deceptively appears to be a dichotomy.  
In fact, there is only a continuum of greater or lesser ‘ruleness.’”). 
230 Id. at 58.  See also Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–88 (1976) (describing the paradigmatic rule as one that “is a directive to 
an official that requires him to respond to the presence together of each of a list of easily 
distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a determinate way”). 
231 See Sullivan, supra note 228, at 58 (“A rule captures the background principle or policy in 
a form that from then on operates independently.”). 
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fact situation.”232  Standards typically direct the decision-maker to take into 
account the totality of relevant circumstances rather than a small number of 
triggering facts.
233
 
The two most salient consequences of articulating a legal directive as a rule, 
on the one hand, or a standard, on the other, are the amount of predictability 
afforded to actors ex ante and the amount of discretion permitted decision-makers 
ex post.
234
  That is to say, rules provide greater predictability to actors whose 
conduct is regulated by the directive regarding the legal consequences of their 
conduct, while standards provide those actors with far less predictability about 
those consequences.
235
  At the same time, rules afford less discretion to decision-
makers responsible for evaluating the conduct of those governed by the legal 
directive, while standards afford those decision-makers more discretion in 
evaluating whether the conduct satisfies those directives.
236
 
The debate between Justices Black and Frankfurter over how to interpret the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the paradigmatic debate 
between rules and standards.
237
  The “fundamental fairness” approach, focusing on 
the nebulous nature of the words “due process of law,” was inherently standard-
based.
238
  We saw this in the application of the Betts “special circumstances” 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
232 Id.  See also Kennedy, supra note 230, at 1688 (“A standard refers directly to one of the 
substantive objectives of the legal order.”). 
233 See Sullivan, supra note 228, at 59.  See also Kennedy, supra note 230, at 1688 (“The 
application of a standard requires the judge both to discover the facts of a particular situation and to 
assess them in terms of the purposes or social values embodied in the standard.”). 
234 See Kennedy, supra note 230, at 1688 (“[T]he two great social virtues of formally 
realizable rules, as opposed to standards or principles, are the restraint of official arbitrariness and 
certainty.”). 
235 See Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 543, 556 (1996) (observing that “rule-based decisionmaking increases the likelihood of 
wrong results just because of its necessarily premature decision of cases that have not yet arisen” but 
that this comes “in exchange for the virtue[] of predictability”); see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (adopting a definition of rules and 
standards by “which the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to 
give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act” (emphasis omitted)); Carol M. 
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592 (1988) (“Judicial 
punctiliousness about establishing and following clear rules, one would suppose, can influence 
behavior in the direction of greater productivity or carefulness.”). 
236 Sullivan, supra note 228, at 57 (“[L]egal directives take different forms that vary in the 
relative discretion they afford the decisionmaker.”). 
237 See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional 
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261, 299 n.220 (1995) (noting the “rules-standards debate between 
Justices Frankfurter and Black [that] arose in the context of the incorporation debate”); Jeffrey L. 
Fisher, Categorical Requirements in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1526 
(2006) (“Justice Black championed rules, while Justice Frankfurter defended standards.”); Sullivan, 
supra note 228, at 26 (characterizing the debate between Justices Black and Frankfurter as a debate 
over rules versus standards). 
238 See Chhablani, supra note 150, at 44 (“[A]n ad hoc balancing of state and individual 
interests is more properly a feature of due process analysis.”). 
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standard, by which appointment of counsel was required in state criminal cases 
only in the presence of special circumstances describing a variety of factors 
relating to the characteristics of the defendant and the charges against him.  And 
we saw it in the application of the “overborne will” standard, which took into 
account the totality of the circumstances characterizing a police interrogation and 
the suspect being interrogated.  These tests left trial judges and police officers, 
respectively, up in the air over whether a constitutional violation would later be 
found because each test can be employed only after a trial or an interrogation, 
respectively, has already taken place. 
This unpredictable, retrospective nature of the “fundamental fairness” 
approach is reflected in the very language of the Due Process Clause.
239
  The 
injunction that persons not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law” is inherently retrospective.  It can come into play only after the 
person has been convicted and thereby “deprived of life, liberty, or property.”  
When the Supreme Court translated this edict into a requirement of “fundamental 
fairness,” the retrospective nature of the inquiry was even clearer, given that 
“fairness is an ex post consideration.”240 
The incorporation approach leans heavily on rules.  The “meta-rule” of 
incorporation is to apply the Bill of Rights to the States exactly as it applies to the 
federal government.
241
  And to the extent that each purportedly incorporated 
provision is capable of rule-like application, incorporation favors rules over 
standards in that respect as well.
242
  We saw this in Gideon, with its bright-line rule 
that appointed counsel was required in every serious criminal case, and we saw it 
in Miranda, with its bright-line rule that confessions not preceded by warnings and 
waiver are deemed compelled.  It is thus no coincidence that Justice Black rested 
his incorporationist approach in large part on the need to constrain the discretion of 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
239 See id. at 41 (“[A] retrospective evaluation . . . is a hallmark of Due Process analysis 
focused on the fundamental fairness of proceedings . . . .”). 
240 Rose, supra note 235, at 593. 
241 See Schauer, supra note 235, at 558 (discussing Justice “Black’s rule-based approach . . . to 
questions of incorporation”). 
242 Incorporation becomes less rule-like when the purportedly incorporated provision itself sets 
out a standard rather than a rule, such as, arguably, the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of 
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  But even here, the Court has 
attempted to structure rights in a rule-like way when possible.  For example, the Court has interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment as erecting a “warrant-preference rule,” instructing police to secure a warrant 
prior to searching and seizing, subject to a number of exceptions.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge 
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”) (footnote omitted).  And even within these 
exceptions, the Court has, with varying degrees of success, preferred to fashion bright-line rules to 
guide officer conduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (establishing 
that the person of arrestee may be searched upon arrest with no additional showing of suspicion). 
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judges in determining constitutional commands.
243
  And it is no surprise that 
Justice Scalia, his successor in carrying the banner of “total and exclusive” 
incorporation—the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of 
Rights but provides no further protection
244—is an outspoken advocate of judicial 
use of rules over standards whenever possible.
245
 
Again, the temporal aspect of incorporation—its prospectivity and, thus, 
predictability—is reflected in the provisions that are now incorporated against the 
States.  The Sixth Amendment, for example, lists the rights that must be provided 
before and during the trial itself: it must be public, before a jury, with the aid of 
counsel, attended by the rights of confrontation and compulsory process, and so 
forth.
246
  It consists of a series of imperatives to be followed before the fact, not a 
standard to evaluate conduct after the fact. 
Thus, the shift from fundamental fairness to incorporation—from Betts to 
Gideon and from Brown to Miranda—can be seen as a shift from standards to 
rules.  This movement encompassed two separate shifts correlating to two of the 
most important characteristics of rules and standards: from less to greater 
predictability for before-the-fact police (in interrogating) and judges (in appointing 
counsel); and from greater to less discretion for after-the-fact judges in 
determining whether the Constitution had been violated. 
 
B. Step Two: The Persistence of Standards 
 
Rules, however, rarely completely displace standards.  Standards persist.
247
  
For one thing, rules sometimes dispatch standards merely temporarily, only to have 
them pop up again in a different place in the analysis, to be battled once more, like 
a game of Whack-a-Mole.  The rule created in Miranda falls into this category.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
243 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  See also Schauer, supra note 235, at 558 
(observing that Justice Black’s position on incorporation was based on the “view that understanding 
the constitutional text in rule-like terms would produce less variable decisions in the hands of the 
Court itself”). 
244 See supra note 29 and accompanying text; see also Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo 
Black?  The Court’s Jot for Jot Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1090 & 
n.13 (1998) (characterizing Justice Scalia as a “justice . . . who likely would, if not for stare decisis, 
happily pitch substantive due process caselaw altogether”). 
245 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989); see also Schauer, supra note 235, at 558 (observing that Justices Black and Scalia were both 
“proponents of rules”). 
246 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
247 See Rose, supra note 235, at 604 (describing how rules often give way to standards). 
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Miranda’s bright-line rule added, to the pre-existing right not to be coerced into 
making statements, the right to avoid introduction into evidence of statements 
made during custodial interrogation in ignorance of the rights to silence and 
counsel.  Once the newly created right is satisfied, however, the pre-existing right 
to be free from coercion—measured by the same messy standard developed 
through common-law accretion since 1936—takes center stage once more. 
Moreover, creation of a rule might spawn new questions that can be answered 
only with reference to standards.  Like the heads of the mythical Hydra, each 
standard that is slain might be replaced with one or more new standards.  Gideon 
falls into this category.  Almost as soon as the Court fashioned the bright-line 
Gideon rule that indigent defendants in state court were entitled to the assistance of 
appointed counsel in all cases, it was confronted with the question of what level 
that assistance of counsel had to meet in order to be constitutionally sufficient.  But 
counsel must take countless actions and make countless decisions in the defense of 
a criminal case.  Moreover, each individual action and decision cannot neatly be 
categorized as “right” or “wrong,” but instead lies on a continuum of competence, 
as does the totality of counsel’s performance.  This explains why, when lower 
courts first began to tackle this issue in federal cases even prior to Gideon, they 
housed this inquiry in the Fifth Amendment’s flexible Due Process Clause rather 
than the Sixth Amendment’s more rigid Assistance of Counsel Clause.248  It also 
explains why critics of the Strickland standard have observed that it essentially, 
and incongruously, resurrects the old due process fundamental fairness paradigm 
in an incorporationist world.
249
  Measuring the competency of counsel, like 
determining whether an interrogation was coercive, is irreducibly standard-like. 
 
C. Step Three: Scaffolding Rules 
 
In short order, the Court eventually realized that the Gideon and Miranda 
rules could not stand on their own because they went only so far in delineating 
rights of defendants and suspects.  Additional legal directives were necessary to 
buttress these rules.  The Court needed to erect what legal historian Alan Watson 
has called “legal scaffolding,” or legal directives to operationalize pre-existing 
directives.
250
  A bare totality-of-the-circumstance test for effectiveness of counsel 
might have sufficed, as might have resort to the old due process voluntariness test 
for coercion.  But having already rejected nebulous standards in favor of bright-
line rules when it opted for incorporation, the Court was loathe to revert to messy, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
248 See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text. 
249 See generally Chhablani, supra note 150. 
250 See ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 87 (2d ed. 2001) (defining “legal 
scaffolding” as “a back-up system . . . which is dictated by the need to modify the rather more basic 
rules”). 
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fact-intensive standards, at least when it had the choice.  Incorporation demanded 
scaffolds in the form of rules rather than standards if at all possible. 
The strong Strickland and Miranda counter-presumptions fit this paradigm.  
Of course, a heavy but theoretically rebuttable presumption is not quite as rule-like 
as a conclusive presumption, by which a legal conclusion flows inevitably from a 
given fact, such as the Gideon and Miranda presumptions.
251
  But a strong 
presumption is nevertheless far more like a rule than it is like a standard.
252
  This 
becomes particularly clear when we measure the effects of the counter-
presumptions using the same metrics we used to evaluate the rule-ness of Gideon 
and Miranda themselves: discretion afforded ex post and predictability provided ex 
ante. 
Both the presumption of attorney competence and the presumption of non-
coercion sharply curtail judicial discretion.  The former requires decision-makers 
evaluating claims of incompetent counsel to give every benefit of every doubt to 
counsel and to rationalize counsel’s decisions, if at all possible, as strategy.  Only 
when counsel’s actions defy rationalization as strategy will a court later find 
counsel’s performance to have been deficient.  Judges are thus forbidden from 
delving too deeply into the actual motivations for counsel’s decisions.  Instead, the 
presumption of attorney competence tells reviewing judges to take only a 
superficial first pass at counsel’s actions in search of a rational basis for her 
decisions.  Only in the rare case that such a rational basis is not apparent does the 
reviewing judge have discretion to probe more deeply.  Unless counsel’s actions 
appear on their face to be so outrageous as to be beyond rational explanation, the 
record need not be scrutinized further to determine whether they were truly 
strategic. 
Likewise, the presumption of non-coercion demands a constrained and 
superficial role for judges reviewing whether a confession has been coerced.  Gone 
are the days when judges were expected to discern the dozens of factors that might 
have made an interrogation coercive, evaluate how these factors interacted with 
one another, and reach a refined conclusion as to whether the suspect’s will had 
been overborne.  Instead, judges are confined almost exclusively to looking at 
whether Miranda warnings were given and waived.  Only in the rare case where 
some circumstance of the interrogation or characteristic of the suspect raises a red 
flag—some aspect that appears on its face to be truly outrageous—may judges 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
251 The Gideon and Miranda conclusive presumptions—respectively, that the presence of 
criminal charges is always a “special circumstance” and that custodial interrogation is inherently 
compulsive—brings to mind Professor Sullivan’s evocative characterization of a rule “as simply the 
crystalline precipitate of prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way.”  Sullivan, 
supra note 228, at 62. 
252 See id. at 60 n.246 (“[S]trong presumptions . . . tend toward the rule-like pole of the 
continuum.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L. REV. 
743, 752 (1998) (“Almost as rule-like in practice [as categorical tests] are tests that use strong 
presumptions to decide cases once a threshold classification has been made.”). 
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probe more deeply.  In mine-run cases of intensive interrogation, even those that 
might have been deemed coercive in an earlier day, the presumption of non-
coercion holds and the judicial role is strictly cabined. 
In terms of predictability, the Miranda and Strickland counter-presumptions 
are strongly rule-like as well.  Gone are the days when police could scarcely know 
during the course of a lengthy interrogation what factors a court would later find 
significant—including those unknown and unknowable to the officer—in 
determining whether the interrogation was coercive.  Predictability under such a 
regime was at its nadir, which is precisely why the Court decided in Miranda that 
it needed to “give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies 
and courts to follow.”253  Today, the presumption of non-coercion acts as a safe-
harbor rule, telling police in advance that, as long as they adhere to the dictates of 
Miranda, their tactics later in the interrogation will virtually never be questioned. 
The presumption of attorney competence, too, acts as a safe-harbor rule of 
sorts, telling defense attorneys that they are free to defend their clients in the 
manner in which they choose and their tactics will virtually never be second-
guessed.  While the guidance so provided does not consist of concrete steps to be 
followed, it is no less clear in its message: “Do as you wish and you will (almost) 
never be questioned.”  The presumption of attorney competence provides 
predictability for defense counsel by laying out wide parameters within which to 
do their jobs, ensuring that their actions will almost always be ratified later. 
That incorporation strongly prefers rules to standards does not necessarily 
explain why the Court chose these rules.  But the Miranda presumption of non-
coercion was all but inevitable.  To understand why, one must remember that the 
Supreme Court has never resolved the question of what constitutes coercion in 
violation of due process principles.  Instead, the Court pulled something of a bait-
and-switch in Miranda, changing the focus from coercion to compulsion, two 
concepts that are not synonymous.
254
  Even if the Miranda Court equated custodial 
interrogation without administration of warnings with compulsion, it dodged the 
question of coercion.  True, a later Court might have concluded that all custodial 
interrogation, whether warned or not, constitutes compulsion, thereby creating a 
rule that would have obviated the need for any further refinement of the coercion 
question.  But such a rule would have been a sharp deviation from, not an 
implementation of, Miranda.  Thus, absent the rule-like presumption of non-
coercion, courts and police would have been thrown back into the pre-Miranda due 
process morass. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
253 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1966). 
254 See Stinneford, supra note 209, at 465–66 (observing that the Miranda Court “explicitly 
denied that the two terms mean the same thing, holding that a confession obtained through custodial 
interrogation could violate the Fifth Amendment even if it would be considered voluntary under the 
Due Process Clause”). 
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It is also difficult to imagine any other rule-like guidelines that the Court 
could have created in Strickland other than something akin to the presumption of 
attorney competence.  Numerous critics of the approach adopted in Strickland, 
including Justice Marshall in dissent in that case,
255
 have suggested adoption, in 
whole or in part, of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Defense Function (“ABA Standards”)256 to give concrete guidance for 
attorneys and reviewing judges.
257
  But for the Court to have adopted all or part of 
the ABA Standards as a constitutional requirement would have been highly 
problematic. 
For one thing, the very first standard cautions that “the[] standards . . . are not 
intended to be used as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of 
defense counsel to determine the validity of a conviction.”258  Moreover, many of 
the standards instruct defense counsel how to conduct themselves when faced with 
ethical dilemmas having little or nothing to do with competent representation.
259
  
For example, Standard 4-4.6 addresses the thorny issue of what defense counsel 
should do after coming into possession of physical evidence that implicates a client 
in criminal activity.
260
 
But more fundamentally, the ABA Standards provide . . . well, standards.  
Accordingly, the Standards consist of general guidelines, shot through with 
imprecise and context-dependent language.  For example, in expounding upon one 
of the most important and most litigated duties of counsel, the duty to investigate, 
Standard 4-4.1 tells us that counsel must “explore all avenues leading to facts 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
255 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 709 & n.3 (1984) (citing with approval 
various attempts by lower courts “to develop particularized standards designed to ensure that all 
defendants receive effective legal assistance” and noting that “[m]any of these decisions rely heavily 
on the standards developed by the American Bar Association”). 
256 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 
1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. 
257 See, e.g., William H. Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a 
Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 243 (1979) (“recommend[ing] increased reliance on the” 
ABA Standards).  See also Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1283 n.144 (1986) (“Those who support the categorical approach generally 
contend that the American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function provide appropriate 
rules.”). 
258 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 256, Standard 4-1.1; see William J. Genego, The Future of 
Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 181, 205 (1984) (making similar observations). 
259 See Calhoun, supra note 170, at 437–38 (“[S]ome of the American Bar Association’s 
standards for defense attorneys are inappropriate because they concern defense counsel’s ethical 
conduct and general role in the criminal justice system without referring specifically to the attorney’s 
responsibility to provide the defendant with effective assistance of counsel.”) (footnote omitted); 
Erickson, supra note 257, at 244 (“A number of the standards express self-evident concepts of 
professional ethics which, at most, serve to aid a lawyer in resolving some of the conflicting demands 
placed upon him by his clients and his responsibility to the court.”) (footnote omitted). 
260 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 256, Standard 4-4.6. 
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relevant to the merits of the case.”261  But they do not tell us how far down every 
“avenue[]” counsel must travel, nor how much deference to accord counsel in her 
determination that some facts are not “relevant” to the case.  Other examples 
abound of imprecision in the Standards.  Counsel must consult with her client 
about strategic decisions only “where feasible and appropriate.”262  Counsel must 
provide her client with information only to the extent that requests therefor are 
“reasonable.”263  Counsel may not recommend acceptance of a plea until after 
“appropriate investigation and study of the case.”264  These general guidelines are 
non-controversial, as one might expect from directives that one’s conduct be 
“appropriate” and “reasonable.”  But for that very reason they tell us almost 
nothing about how defense counsel should conduct themselves in specific cases.  It 
is unsurprising that even Professor Vivian Berger, an early and prominent critic of 
Strickland, dismissed the ABA Standards as being “vague to the point of 
uselessness” in assessing specific arguable missteps by counsel.265 
Moreover, judicial and academic attempts to supplement and amplify these 
standards through a “checklist” approach have not led to more concrete rules but 
only equally general standards.  For example, Judge William Erickson, in his 
influential pre-Strickland piece, distilled several basic duties from the ABA 
Standards, including that defense counsel “must diligently and actively participate 
in the full and effective preparation of his client’s case,” must “investigate 
carefully all defenses of fact and of law that may be available,” and “must confer 
with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary to elicit matters 
pertinent to his defense.”266  But imposing upon counsel a duty to act “diligently” 
and “actively,” to prepare “full[y] and effective[ly],” to “investigate carefully,” and 
to confer “without undue delay and as often as necessary” does little more than 
does a general edict that counsel act “reasonably.”  Similarly, in another influential 
pre-Strickland piece, Judge David Bazelon endorsed an approach that required 
counsel, among other things, to “[c]onfer with the client . . . as often as necessary,” 
“develop all appropriate defenses,” and “[c]onduct all necessary investigations.”267  
But hedging obligations with words such as “necessary” and “appropriate” hardly 
creates sharp-edged rules.  Rather, these are just different ways of re-stating a 
vague standard of “reasonably effective assistance.”  Likewise, it is one thing to 
suggest that defense counsel “must make . . .  an opening statement,” “objections 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
261 Id., Standard 4-4.1. 
262 Id., Standard 4-5.2(b). 
263 Id., Standard 4-3.8(a). 
264 Id., Standard 4-6.1. 
265 Berger, supra note 135, at 83; see also Genego, supra note 258, at 204 (“When addressing 
what a lawyer must do, the Standards issue only broad, generalized commands . . . .”); Peter W. 
Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 131 
(1977) (“[T]he [ABA] guidelines offer little help in answering specific questions.”). 
266 Erickson, supra note 257, at 245 (citing People v. Pope, 590 P.2d 859, 866–67 (1979)). 
267 David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1973) 
(citing Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968)). 
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that further the defendant’s interests,” and “a closing argument that does not hurt 
the defendant’s case,” must call witnesses that counsel “reasonably believes will 
help the defendant’s case,” and must impeach all prosecution witnesses unless 
counsel “reasonably believes that to do so . . . would do more harm than good.”268  
It is quite another to apply these edicts to an actual case where the issue might be 
whether the opening statement was fulsome enough to give the jury a good 
preview of the defendant’s narrative, or whether declining to make a valid 
objection or really “go after” a prosecution witness for fear of antagonizing the 
jury was a reasonable strategy, or whether the benefits outweighed the costs of 
putting a particular witness on the stand, or whether a closing argument that 
depicted the defendant as deeply immoral but not criminal “hurt the defendant’s 
case.” 
Thus, the choice in Strickland was not between different sets of rules.  It was 
between rules and standards: the heavily rule-like presumption of attorney 
competence and the morass of case-by-case adjudication based solely on the 
nebulous standard of “reasonably effective assistance.”  Having largely escaped 
from this snare twenty years earlier, the Court was loath to return. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This Article is neither an indictment nor a celebration of the Court’s current 
Gideon and Miranda jurisprudence.  It is one explanation, among others, for how 
we arrived here.  More than that, however, it is an attempt to flush out the darker 
side of incorporation.  Methodologically, incorporation carries a great many 
benefits vis-à-vis the other main competing approach, “fundamental fairness” 
analysis, primarily predictability and constraint on judicial discretion.  And in pre-
incorporation days, lack of predictability and unconstrained judicial discretion all 
too often operated to the detriment of criminal defendants.  But those who favor 
incorporation over “fundamental fairness” should recognize that with the sweet 
comes the bitter, even if incorporation was the sweeter choice overall.
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